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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW:
THE SPECIAL CASE OF MULTISTATE DEFAMATION
JAMES R. PIELEMEIERt
INTRODUCTION
Last year the Supreme Court held that nonresident plaintiffs may
sue publishers for defamation in any state where the publisher regu-
larly circulates materials.' In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.2 the
Court upheld the New Hampshire courts' assertion of jurisdiction over
a claim for nationwide damages by a nonresident who had only incon-
sequential connections to the state, even though New Hampshire was
the only siate in which the statute of limitations had not run.' This
ruling potentially enables many defamation plaintiffs to forum shop
and to file suit in states whose defamation laws are most favorable to
their claims.4
Although defamation defendants are now subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts in any state in which they regularly distribute materials,
the conclusion that they may also be subject to the defamation laws of
any state with jurisdiction does not automatically follow. In Keeton the
Court explicitly distinguished choice of law issues from its jurisdictional
inquiry and declined to resolve them.5 The Court thereby left unsettled
whether the Constitution limits a state's ability to apply its defamation
law.' In addition, even if a state with jurisdiction may constitutionally
apply its law in a defamation action, its choice of law principles may
lead it to decline to do so. In short, whether a state with jurisdiction in
a defamation case may apply its laws and, if it may, under what cir-
© Copyright 1985, James R. Pielemeier.
Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law.
104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
2 See id. at 1480, 1481-82.
a See id. at 1477, 1480. Although regular circulation was necessary to establish
minimum contacts between New Hampshire and the defendant, the Court disclaimed
any reliance on the plaintiff's connection with New Hampshire in reaching its decision.
See id. at 1495 n.5.
" Indeed, the Court suggested as much. See id. at 1480 ("Petitioner's successful
search . . . is no different from the litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a
forum with favorable substantive or procedural rules .... .
5 See id. at 1480 & nn.9-10.
6 Dictum elsewhere in the opinion suggests that New Hampshire could, consistent
with constitutional principles, apply its own defamation law. See id. at 1479; infra
notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
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cumstances it should apply them are important questions that remain
after Keeton. The first question is one that the Supreme Court has
never addressed directly, and the second lies outside its jurisdiction."
And recent literature on the application of choice of law principles to
defamation cases has been surprisingly sparse.8
This Article addresses these questions. Part I outlines some of the
issues upon which defamation laws differ from state to state. It demon-
strates that many states' laws are intentionally more lenient towards
defamation defendants, reflecting policy determinations by those states
to subordinate their interest in compensating plaintiffs to their interest
in enhancing free speech.
Part II surveys choice of law approaches used by courts today and
their actual or probable application to multistate defamation cases. It
shows that many approaches favor the application of forum law.
Therefore Keeton potentially enables defamation plaintiffs to shop ef-
fectively, not only for their forum, but for the law most favorable to
their claims. This could result in subjection of the multistate media, in
every case, to nationwide damages based on the most hostile defamation
law of any of the states to which its products travel.
Part III then addresses whether the Constitution limits the states'
choice of law in defamation actions. Allstate Insurance Co. v. HagueO
7 In the absence of federal or constitutional questions, the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to dictate state law. As the Court stated in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302 (1981),
It is not for this Court to say whether the choice-of-law analysis sug-
gested by Professor Leflar is to be preferred or whether we would make
the same choice-of-law decision if sitting as the Minnesota Supreme
Court. Our sole function is to determine whether the Minnesota Supreme
Court's choice of its own substantive law in this case exceeded federal
constitutional limitations.
Id. at 307. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-32, at 119-20
(1978).
8 The problem has long been subject to academic analysis. See, e.g., Note, The
Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation-A Functional Approach, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1463 (1964); Comment, An Examination of Publication and Choice of Law
Problems in Multi-State Libel, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 823 (1962); Note, Conflict of
Laws-Multi-State Defamation-Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 28
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1006 (1953). These articles are out of date, having been written with-
out the benefit of more recent Supreme Court decisions that address the conflict of
laws, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), and that impose constitu-
tional guarantees in the area of defamation, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964)). In the twenty years since New York Times v. Sullivan, only one
article has has focused on choice of law in the defamation context: Rose, Interstate
Libel and Choice of Law: Proposals for the Future, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1515 (1979).
The thesis of this Article diverges substantially from Professor Rose's, which argued
that courts must apply the law of the place of the defendant's actions. See id. at 1532.
9 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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is the Supreme Court's most recent decision delimiting when a state
may apply its law consistently with due process and full faith and
credit requirements. A superficial reading of Hague suggests that any
state with jurisdiction on the basis relied on in Keeton could constitu-
tionally apply its defamation laws. However, a careful analysis of the
consequences that would follow in the defamation context suggests a
different result. The application of forum law in this type of case
would substantially jeopardize constitutional values that are not so
clearly threatened by the application of Hague's standards in other
types of cases.
In particular, such a practice may totally undermine the ability of
states with relatively speech-enhancing"0 rules to further their legiti-
mate sovereign interests. This result would be clearly inconsistent with
fundamental precepts underlying the Supreme Court's full faith and
credit decisions." Further, the application of forum law by courts with
such incidental connections to the action would inappropriately deter
the dissemination of information among the states and could result in
the practical federalization of law governing multistate defamation,
which traditionally has been the province of the states. Finally, such a
practice would impinge substantially on first amendment principles re-
quiring that states have strong and legitimate justifications for their
laws that intrude upon protected speech. In light of these dangers to
constitutional values, Part IV proposes a model for the choice of law in
defamation actions. It concludes that forum states are constitutionally
restrained from applying to the entirety of a multistate defamation
claim law that is more speech-inhibiting than that of a state that has a
significant interest, relative to other states, in compensating the
plaintiff.
In conclusion, Part V suggests that appreciation for the concerns
elucidated above should lead courts properly applying extant choice of
law theories to reach results consistent with those suggested in Part IV.
They follow not only as a matter of constitutional compulsion but also
from sound application of well-accepted common law choice of law
principles. This Article is thus intended as a guide to choice of defama-
tion law problems in the wake of Keeton's validation of expansive juris-
diction over the multistate media.
10 Throughout this Article, "speech-enhancing" and "speech-inhibiting" will be
used to describe the effects of the application of one state's rule of law as opposed to
another's. If one state's law is more likely to result in a defendant's liability, it will be
characterized as "speech-inhibiting." The law of another state will be "speech-enhanc-
ing" if its application is less likely to result in liability.
"I See infra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
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I. INTERSTATE DIFFERENCES IN DEFAMATION LAW
The basic elements of a defamation action are relatively consistent
from state to state. They are (1) publication (2) of a statement of fact
(3) that is false and (4) defamatory and (5) that reasonably refers to the
plaintiff, (6) is made with the requisite degree of fault, and (7) causes
actual injury. 2 Many variations exist, however, as to what constitutes
sufficient proof of these elements, whether particular defenses are avail-
able, and whether special procedural rules apply. Because of these dif-
ferences, application of one state's defamation laws rather than an-
other's can substantially affect the outcome of a defamation case. This
Part highlights several of the differences among state laws and demon-
strates that these differences reflect deliberate state policy choices, stem-
ming from a balance of free speech values against interests in compen-
sating injured plaintiffs.
The requisite degree of fault may be the most significant defama-
tion element upon which state laws differ because it prescribes the basic
standard of conduct that publishers must meet. The Supreme Court has
held that public officials and public figures may recover for defamation
only upon a showing of actual malice by the publisher,"3 a standard
that requires a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
the truth.' 4 As for the defamation of private persons, however, the
Court has left to the states the option of defining for themselves the
appropriate standard, "so long as they do not impose liability without
fault."'" Accepting this invitation, several states have held that, in defa-
mation actions brought by private persons, the requisite standard of
fault is-simple negligence.' Others require a showing of actual malice
12 See S. METCALF, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTER,
AND REPORTERS § 1.01 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976).
13 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964) (public offi-
cials); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring, joined in relevant part by Black, Douglas, Brennan & White, JJ.) (public
figures).
14 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). The meaning of "reck-
less disregard" was refined in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-32 (1968), in
which the Court stated that the standard required "sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication." 390 U.S. at 731.
'5 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (reversing use of actual
malice standard for private plaintiff).
1" See, e.g., McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882,
886 (Ky. 1981) (Kentucky Constitution mandates simple negligence standard), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 596, 350 A.2d
688, 697 (1976) (adopting simple negligence standard of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975)).
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in any case involving reports on events of public interest.17 New York
has adopted an intermediate approach requiring gross irresponsibility
in all cases."' And even among the states adopting a simple negligence
standard, there are variations. Some judge negligence by the standards
of the publishing community,1" while others employ only an ordinary
care standard. 0
Other elements upon which state laws differ include the require-
ment of falsity, the defamatory nature of the statement, and the requi-
site reference to the plaintiff. For example, although some courts re-
quire the plaintiff to prove falsity,21 others continue to place the burden
of proving truth on the defendant.22 Some jurisdictions have found
words capable of a defamatory meaning that others have not.2" Illinois
judges defamatory meaning by its "innocent construction rule,"
whereby a publication, as a matter of law, cannot be deemed defama-
tory if the words may reasonably be given an innocent interpretation.24
Other states, however, leave to the trier of fact any statement that is
capable of either innocent or defamatory meaning. 5 Illinois also applies
17 See, e.g., Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103,
1106 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); AAFCO Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 679, 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1974), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976); Lins v. Evening News Ass'n, 129 Mich. App. 419, 434-35, 342
N.W.2d 573, 580-81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
18 Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d
569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975).
19 See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 233, 531 P.2d 76, 84
(1975).
20 See, e.g. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 197-99, 340 N.E.2d 292, 298-99
(1975).
21 See, e.g., Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371, 375 (6th
Cir. 1981).
22 See, e.g., Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 147, 377
A.2d 807, 814 (Law Div. 1977), modified on other grounds, 164 N.J. Super. 465, 397
A.2d 334 (1979).
22 Compare Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 663, 318 N.W.2d 141, 154 (1982)
(statement that person has been fired may reasonably be found defamatory by jury),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982) with Nichols v. Item Publishers, Inc., 309 N.Y. 596,
601, 132 N.E.2d 860, 862 (1956) (report of a person's removal from office cannot be
defamatory without implication that removal was due to misconduct).
24 See, e.g., John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442-43, 181 N.E. 2d 105, 108,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962). The Illinois innocent construction rule was recently
modified. See Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 351-52, 442 N.E.2d 195, 198-99
(1982) (statement not actionable only if innocent construction is a reasonable construc-
tion). For a discussion of the significance of this modification, see Malone & Smolla,
The Future of Defamation in Illinois After Colson v. Stieg and Chapski v. Copley
Press, Inc., 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 219, 289-96 (1983) (suggesting that the modification
was not significant).
25 See, e.g., Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Pitka, 376 P.2d 190, 194 (Alaska 1962)
("[I]f the language used is capable of two interpretations, one of which would be de-
famatory and the other not, then it is for the jury to determine . . . ."); Denny v.
Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 663, 318 N.W.2d 141, 153-54 (1982) (remanding for jury
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its innocent construction rule to the issue of whether the statement rea-
sonably refers to the plaintiff-if the statement can reasonably be read
to refer to a person other than the plaintiff, the case will be dismissed.26
Other states require only that those who read or hear the statement
reasonably understand that the plaintiff is the person to whom the
statement refers.27
Absent malice, damages are constitutionally limited to compensa-
tion for actual injury,28 but the types of recoverable damages vary.
Some states require proof of "special damages"-specific pecuniary
losses-before permitting recovery for a false statement that is not de-
famatory per se.29 Others do not distinguish the per se category and
permit recovery of general damages without regard to the character of
the defamation."0 At least three different approaches exist towards pu-
nitive damages. Some states permit recovery upon a showing of know-
ing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, 1 the constitutionally re-
quired minimum. 2 Others impose a requirement that the plaintiff
prove common law malice, consisting of ill will, hostility, or an evil
interpretation of statement's defamatory nature), cert. denied 459 U.S. 883 (1982).
28 See John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108, cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962); Belmonte v. Rubin, 68 Ill. App. 3d 700, 701, 386 N.E.2d
904, 904 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
217 See, e.g., Dijkstra v. Westerink, 168 N.J. Super. 128, 133, 401 A.2d 1118,
1120 (App. Div. 1979).
28 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
28 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 179, 345 S.W.2d
34, 40 (1961) (only words per se injurious can support a recovery of general damages).
For statements to be defamatory per se, "the words used must be so unambiguous as to
be reasonably susceptible of only one interpretation-that is, one which has a natural
tendency to injure another's reputation." Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Pitka, 376 P.2d
190, 194 (Alaska 1962) (footnote omitted).
'0 See, e.g., Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc., 365 Mass. 141, 147, 310
N.E.2d 343, 347 (1974) (all libel is actionable without pleading special damages); Hin-
kle v. Alexander, 244 Or. 267, 277, 417 P.2d 586, 589 (1966) (en banc) (rejecting
separate category of per se libel); Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452,
460-61, 113 N.W.2d 135, 139 (1962). Recoverable damages include those for impair-
ment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. See Shar-
ratt, 365 Mass. at 148, 310 N.E.2d at 348; Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W.
Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 110 n.5, 334 N.E.2d 494, 498 n.5 (1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975).
SI See, e.g., Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 893, 275 S.E.2d 632, 638 (1981).
22 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court stated
that states may not permit recovery of punitive damages in defamation cases, "at least
when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth." Id. at 349. While fault meeting this standard is clearly a prerequisite for
an award of punitive damages, because of the negative phrasing of the statement in
Gertz, the issue whether punitive damages can ever be awarded in defamation cases is
regarded as still open. See M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA
LAW 171 (2d ed. 1982).
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intention to defame or injure."3 Still others prohibit recovery of all pu-
nitive damages.34
Different states also recognize different defenses. In some states,
failure to demand a retraction can limit a plaintiff to special damages "
or preclude the recovery of punitive damages." In Wisconsin such a
demand is a prerequisite to suit. 7 Yet, in many states a demand for
retraction has no effect or serves only to mitigate damages.3" A privilege
of neutral reportage protects the accurate reporting of defamatory state-
ments on matters of public interest in some states 9 and not in others.40
The existence of other privileges also varies from state to state.
41
Finally, many states apply special procedural rules. Some explic-
itly favor summary judgment in defamation actions; 42 others disfavor
33 See, e.g., Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 650 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying
Florida law); Matthews v. Deland State Bank, 334 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
34 See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 118-19, 593 P.2d 777, 788-89 (1979)
(Oregon Constitution permits recovery for actual damages only); Farrar v. Tribune
Publishing Co., 57 Wash. 2d. 549, 552-53, 358 P.2d 792, 794 (1961) ("Only compen-
satory damages can be recovered. Exemplary damages are unknown to our law.").
11 See, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 30, 459 P.2d 912, 917-18, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 365-66 (1969); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-653.01 to .03 (1982).
36 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-186 (1975).
37 See Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 1, 3, 259 N.W.2d 691,
692 (1977) (construing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(2) (West 1983)).
1, See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 174, 345 S.W.2d
34, 38 (1961) (defendant's full retraction can only be considered in mitigating dam-
ages); Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 577, 106 S.E.2d 258, 263 (1958)
("Retraction of a libel is a matter to be considered in mitigation, but does not bar
punitive damages . . ").
39 See, e.g., Krauss v. Champaign News Gazette, Inc., 59 Ill. App. 3d 745, 747,
375 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (applying doctrine of neutral reportage).
The Illinois appellate courts are divided over the continued validity of this privilege.
Compare Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 757, 415 N.E.2d 434,
452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (refusing to adopt doctrine of neutral reportage). Ohio contin-
ues to apply the privilege. See, e.g., J.V. Peters & Co. v. Knight-Ridder Co., No.
11335, slip op. at 11-12 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1984).
40 See, e.g., McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882,
884 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982).
41 In some states the common law privilege of fair report protects reports of plead-
ings filed in court. See, e.g., Campbell v. New York Evening Post, Inc., 245 N.Y. 320,
328, 157 N.E. 153, 156 (1927). In other states the privilege does not attach unless the
pleading has been brought before a judicial officer. See, e.g., Sanford v. Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 158, 61 N.E.2d 5, 6 (1945). The same privilege pro-
tects reports of statements made by arresting police officers in some states. See, e.g.,
Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., 185 Kan. 61, 66-67, 340 P.2d 396, 400-01 (1959).
In some states such statements are not protected. See, e.g., Lancour v. Herald & Globe
Ass'n, 111 Vt. 371, 385-86, 17 A.2d 253, 259 (1941). Some states have enacted statu-
tory privileges protecting broadcasters from liability for defamatory statements made by
third parties through their facilities. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.043 (West
Supp. 1984).
42 See, e.g., Khalifa v. Muslim Students' Ass'n, 131 Ariz. 328, 329, 641 P.2d 242,
243 (Ct. App. 1981); Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
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it43 or are neutral. 4 4 A plaintiff's ability to force disclosure of the iden-
tity of a defamation defendant's sources varies, through the existence of
shield laws, from total preclusion,45 to availability conditioned upon
prerequisites, 46 to availability fettered by no special limitations. 47 And,
of course, the statutes of limitation for defamation actions vary from
state to state.48
This survey of state defamation law is by no means exhaustive, yet
it illustrates that the differences among state laws are substantial. The
extent of these disparities leads one to question why there are these
differences. Although not all of the rules described above have a clearly
articulated judicial or legislative history, the reasoning behind those
that do provides a fairly clear answer to that question. The delineation
of defamation rules requires a balancing of the values of reputation and
free speech;49 the differences among state laws are attributable to the
fact that the states have chosen to weigh these values differently.
To illustrate, states that require private plaintiffs to show a degree
of fault greater than simple negligence stress that the vagueness of a
lesser standard would cast a chilling effect upon the media and that the
resulting self-censorship would unduly hamper free and robust de-
bate.5" Believing a relatively unhampered press to be important to a
3d 672, 685, 586 P.2d 572, 578, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 264 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
961 (1979).
' See, e.g., Hall v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 46 N.C. App. 760, 765, 266 S.E.2d
397, 401 (1980) (issue of malice in defamation actions renders summary judgment
inappropriate).
41 See, e.g., American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 375 So. 2d 239, 249 (Ala.
1979) (on rehearing) ("[T]he summary judgement procedure which must be followed
in libel cases is the same as in other cases . . ").
' See, e.g., Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 523, 525
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (construing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (1982)).
48 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.021-595.025 (West Supp. 1984).
41 See, e.g., Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 298, 562 P.2d 791,
801, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364
Mass. 317, 322, 303 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1973).
Another example of procedural differences is New York's unique rule of evidence
that forbids witness testimony to the effect that she believed the communication was
about the plaintiff. See Michaels v. Gannett Co., 10 A.D.2d 417, 420, 199 N.Y.S.2d
778, 781 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) ("[T]he testimony of third persons that they under-
stood the defamatory statement to refer to the plaintiff is not admissible . . . .") (dic-
tum); see also Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681, 683 (2d Cir.
1961) (construing N.Y. case law), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962).
8 Compare, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 1952) (one year) and Idaho
Code § 5-219(5) (1979) (two years) with MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4 (Michie/
Law. Co-op. 1980) (three years).
"' As the Supreme Court has noted, "'Whatever is added to the field of libel is
taken from the field of free debate.'" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
272 (1964) (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 678 (1942)).
" See, e.g., Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103,
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well-informed community 5' and the public interest, 52 these states explic-
itly have subordinated their interest in compensating private individuals
injured by negligent defamation to the free speech interests furthered by
heightened standards of fault. 3 Similarly, California favors summary
judgment in defamation actions "because unnecessarily protracted liti-
gation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights."
5 4
Justifications for other speech-enhancing rules stress the states' de-
sire to encourage the free dissemination of information. The-California
Supreme Court has recognized that its legislature enacted a retraction
statute "to encourage a more active press by means of an increased
insulation of newspapers from liability arising from erroneously pub-
lished statements.1 55 Illinois adopted its privilege of neutral reportage
because "[a] robust and unintimidated press is a necessary ingredient of
self-government." 58 And Minnesota's shield law restricting access to the
media's sources of information was passed to "protect the public inter-
est and the free flow of information."5  These statements and other
speech-enhancing rules58 reflect a common determination. In weighing
1106 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) ("[A] simple negligence rule would have a chilling effect
on the press that would be more harmful to the public interest than the possibility that
a defamed private individual would go uncompensated."); AAFCO Heating and Air
Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 683, 321 N.E.2d
580, 588 (1975) ("A publisher's fear of guessing wrong about juror assessment of the
... news gathering procedures he employs would inevitably deter 'protected'
speech."), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
51 See AAFCO Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
162 Ind. App. 671, 678, 321 N.E.2d 580, 586, (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913
(1976).
11 See Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1106
(Colo. 1982) (en banc) (chilling effect of simple negligence standard more harmful to
public interest than uncompensated defamation plaintiffs).
11 See id.; AAFCO Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications,
Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 683, 321 N.E.2d 580, 588 (1975) (arguing that damage judg-
ments based on a jury determination of negligence would unduly deter protected
speech), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
" Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 685,
586 P.2d 572, 578, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 264 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
55 See, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 30, 459 P.2d 912, 917, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 365 (1969) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
" Krauss v. Champaign News Gazette, Inc., 59 Ill. App. 3d 745, 746-47, 375
N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (1978).
17 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.022 (West Supp. 1983).
" See, e.g., Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 350, 442 N.E.2d 195, 198
(1982) (Innocent construction rule "comports with the constitutional interests of free
speech and free press and encourages robust discussion of public affairs."); Khalifa v.
Muslim Students' Ass'n, 131 Ariz. 328, 329, 641 P.2d 242, 243 (Ct. App. 1981) ("In
defamation cases, because of the constitutional privilege of free speech . . . summary
judgment is the rule rather than the exception . . . ."); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99,
119, 593 P.2d 777, 789 (1979) (prohibiting "large [punitive] damage recoveries [be-
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the value of free speech against the value of redressing injury to indi-
vidual reputation, the people of the state, through their government,
have decided to forego redress for injury in cases to which the rules
would apply. 59
On the other hand, states that apply relatively speech-inhibiting
rules strike the balance differently. They stress instead the importance
of protecting individual reputations. For example, in announcing that
its privilege of fair report does not protect reports of statements made
by the police, the Vermont Supreme Court stated, "The public interest
does not require that the right to enjoy a good name shall be made
subservient to the right of free speech. ' 6 The Kentucky Supreme
Court, in choosing its standard of simple negligence for private defama-
tion plaintiffs, opined that its constitution "mandates that we adopt a
standard which adequately protects the private individual from defama-
tion."'" Addressing the same issue, the Kansas Supreme Court noted
that its constitution places injury to reputation on the same plane as
injury to person or property. Consequently, the court held that the neg-
ligence standard applied to the latter types of injury should also apply
to defamation. 2 Other state court decisions have favored a defamed
plaintiff's interest in vindication as well as compensation. 3
This divergence shows that the differences among state laws are
neither accidents of common law nor subtle disagreements about minor
cause they] can easily inhibit the exercise of freedom of constitutionally protected
expression").
" Cf. Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 523 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (applying Pa. shield law to preclude recovery):
Simply put, while an individual's interest in his reputation is a basic
concern . . . its reflection in the laws of defamation is solely a matter of
State law ...
• ..The legislature's decision then to favor the public's interest in
access to information over an individual's State common law right to vin-
dicate his reputation is a matter over which the State has almost complete
control and in the circumstances of this case has exercised in a manner
adverse to plaintiff's interests.
Id. at 528. See also Greenberg v. CBS, 69 A.D.2d 693, 708, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988, 996
(N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (applying N.Y. shield law).
60 Lancour v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 111 Vt. 371, 386, 17 A.2d 253, 259 (1941).
6" McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Ky.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982).
62 See Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232-34, 531 P.2d 76, 83-84
(1975). Other states have adopted a negligence standard partly on the grounds that it is
the standard applied to other types of injury. See, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184,
194-95, 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297, 299 (1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
580, 596, 350 A.2d 688, 697 (1976).
63 See, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1975);
(adopting negligence standard); Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 573,
576, 106 S.E.2d 258, 261, 263 (1958) (upholding punitive damages).
[Vol. 133:381
CHOICE OF DEFAMATION LAW
legal nuances. The differences result from a distinct diversity of opinion
among states regarding the sanctity of reputation and the importance of
a healthy press. Thus it should come as no surprise that these differ-
ences will frequently affect the outcome of litigation. A plaintiff who
can prove simple negligence may be unable to prove reckless disregard
of the truth. The existence of a privilege may assure success for a de-
fendant; its absence defeat. A plaintiff who neglects to demand a timely
retraction may forfeit substantial recovery in some states but not in
others.
Because differences of state law can determine the outcome of def-
amation litigation, predicting which law a court will apply can be criti-
cal to a plaintiffs choice of forum. This is particularly true if the de-
fendant is a nationally-circulated publication, for a plaintiff suing such
a defendant, in light of Keeton, may have a choice of virtually any
forum. Therefore, an understanding of choice of law principles and of
any constitutional restraints on their application is necessary for compe-
tent litigation and adjudication of these claims.
II. CHOICE OF LAW APPROACHES AND THE PREFERENCE FOR
FORUM LAW
Multistate defamation plaintiffs' ability to choose favorable law
depends on the choice of law approaches used by each state. If every
jurisdiction applied the same state's law to the same defamation action,
forum shopping incentives would be miniscule. Although modern choice
of law decisions in defamation cases are scant, the varying choice of law
approaches applied by states today indicate that the law applied is
likely to depend on the forum chosen. Indeed, because of the preference
for forum law incorporated into several of the modern approaches, 4
plaintiffs may often be able to choose a state's law simply by selecting
that state as the forum.
Over thirty years ago, in the context of defamation law, William
Prosser characterized "[tihe realm of conflict of laws [as] a dismal
swamp, filled with quaking quagmires."6 The subsequent emergence
of modern approaches that require the weighing of contacts or the elu-
cidation of state policies underlying the conflicting laws has further
mired the field.6" American courts now follow, singly or in combination,
See infra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
66 Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
"' See J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 166-67 (1984).
See generally E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 16-42 (1982) (discussing
modern approaches). The cases that first adopted modern approaches are less than
thirty years old. See J. MARTIN, supra, at 167-71 (citing leading case of Auten v.
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no less than ten different approaches,"1 and no single approach can
claim the allegiance of a majority of states.6" As the Supreme Court has
observed, each of the fifty states "applies its own set of malleable
choice-of-law rules." 9
Choice of law rules are further complicated by the principle of
depecage, under which a court may apply the law of one state to gov-
ern some issues and the law of a different state to govern other issues in
the same action.10 For example, courts sometimes apply foreign law to
the substantive issues of a case and forum law to the procedural is-
sues.71 Depecage may also be applied to different substantive issues.
7 2
One unusual consequence of this process is that the composite of law
resulting from depecage may permit a recovery in cases in which a
recovery could not have been obtained had the law of any single state
been applied to the claim in its entirety.73 Depecage may be applied
Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954)); W. REESE & M.ROSENBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS CASES AND MATERIALS 468-70 (8th ed. 1984) (citing Schmidt v. Driscoll
Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957)). But see J. MARTIN, supra, at 1
(a surprising number of states still adhere to the traditional territorial approach).
For interesting critiques of choice of law approaches, see Korn, The Choice of Law
Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983); Morrison, Death of Conflicts,
29 VILL. L. REV. 313 (1984).
6'7 See Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 521, 585 (1983).
8 See id. at 586 n.399; cf. J. MARTIN, supra note 66, at 166 (No approach "has
established itself as superior to the rest.").
" Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981).
70 See generally Reese, Depecage; A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 58 (1973).
71 See, e.g., Lillegraven v. Tengs, 375 P.2d 139, 140-43 (Alaska 1962) (combining
British Columbian liability rule with Alaskan statute of limitations); Nelson v. Eckert,
231 Ark. 348, 351-52, 329 S.W.2d 426, 428-29 (1959) (applying forum limitations
rule); Velle Transcendental Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Esquire, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 799,
802-03, 354 N.E.2d 622, 625-26 (1976) (forum limitations rule); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122-44 (1971) (choice of law rules gov-
erning procedure). Characterizing an issue as substantive or procedural can be difficult.
Compare Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 601, 124 N.E. 477, 477 (1919) (burden of
proof procedural) with O'Leary v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 299 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Mo.
1957) (burden of proof substantive).
72 See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jacek, 156 F. Supp. 43, 44-46 (D.N.J.
1957) (applying New Jersey contract law and New York tort law to automobile acci-
dent insurance claim); Sabell v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 36 Colo. App. 60,
64-70, 536 P.2d 1160, 1163-66 (1975) (combining Iowa standard of care with Colo-
rado comparative negligence statute). In defamation actions, see for example, DeRoburt
v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574 (D. Hawaii 1979) (combining Nauru defamation law
with United States constitutional protections) and see also Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F.
Supp. 78, 82-83 & n.11 (E.D. La. 1976) (applying Louisiana contract law and Missis-
sippi slander law).
7' Frequently this results from the combination of a foreign cause of action and a
forum's longer statute of limitations. See, e.g., Lillegraven v. Tengs, 375 P.2d 139
(Alaska 1962) (combining British Columbian liability rule with Alaskan statute of lim-
itations). However, it can arise from recognition of foreign causes of action without
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under each of the choice of law approaches discussed below. Modern
approaches, tending to focus on what law should govern particular is-
sues, may increase the use of depecage.7'
The peculiar nature of defamation actions further complicates the
choice of law issue. The nonphysical nature of the tort and the possibil-
ity that the steps leading up to the defamation (such as investigation,
editing, printing, and dissemination) may occur in several states make
more difficult the determination of which factors are pertinent to the
choice of law and the appropriate weighing of these factors. A final
complication is that many states have yet to articulate their choice of
law principles in the defamation context. Notwithstanding these diffi-
culties, cases applying several of the current choice of law approaches
provide some indication of how cburts will resolve the choice of law
dilemma in defamation cases.
A. The Territorialist Approach
Seventeen jurisdictions apply some version of the traditional terri-
torialist approach to choice of law. 5 Under this approach, courts isolate
a particular event giving rise to the cause of action and apply the law of
the state where that event occurred.7 1 Procedural issues are generally
governed by forum law through depecage.77
Even under this method, choice of law in defamation cases has
been difficult.7 8 The law governing tort liability has traditionally been
the "place of wrong."79 The first Restatement of Conflict of Laws de-
fined this as the place "where the last event necessary to make an actor
liable for an alleged tort takes place."' In defamation actions this was
recognition of immunities granted by that foreign state. If the forum state would not
have recognized the cause of action, a plaintiff may recover even though neither state
would permit recovery had all parts of their laws been applied. For a general analysis
of "impossible" recoveries discussed in the context of a hypothetical case, see D.
CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 34-43 (1965).
74 See Reese, supra note 70, at 59.
75 See Kay, supra note 67, at 586 n.399.
76 See, e.g., Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 133-34, 11 So. 803,
806 (1892) (law of state of injury governs tort actions); Linn v. Employers Reinsurance
Corp., 392 Pa. 58, 60, 139 A.2d 638, 639 (1958) (law of state where contract was
made governs its validity); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 378
(1934).
7 See, e.g., Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 601, 124 N.E. 477, 477 (1919) (bur-
den of proof procedural).
71 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multi-State Torts:
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1951) (Defa-
mation actions "defy all traditional rules.").
79 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1934).
80 Id. § 377.
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generally the state where the defamatory statement was seen or heard
by others."' In multistate defamation, therefore, the requisite last event
occurs in every state in which the statement is circulated. When a
plaintiff seeks to recover nationwide damages in one action,"2 a literal
interpretation of this approach would require application of the law of
each state of circulation. This would necessitate separate instructions to
the jury on the law of each state and a separate award of damages for
the injury suffered in each state. A few courts have actually taken this
tack, resulting in unimaginable complexities and confusion. 8
These difficulties have led many courts to adopt other versions of
the territorialist approach that attempt to isolate a single significant
event, other than the statement's dissemination, to single out one state's
law that may be applied to the entii-ety of the plaintiff's claim.84 How-
ever, no territorialist rule has gained a majority following.85 Fre-
quently, courts have simply applied the law of the forum without ex-
tensive analysis.8" Courts employing the territorialist approach will
usually apply only one state's law to the action in order to avoid undue
complexity. But whether this should be that of the forum state, the
plaintiff's domicile, or elsewhere is an issue territorialist principles do
not definitively resolve.
B. The Most Significant Relationship Approach
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, reflecting the dis-
satisfaction of many courts and scholars with choice of law determina-
tions premised solely on the location of events,87 abandoned the first
SI See id. n.5, illust. 7.
82 Most states adhere to the "single publication rule," see Keeton v. Hustler Mag-
azine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 n.8 (1984), under which a plaintiff can recover in an
action in one jurisdiction damages suffered in all jurisdictions, see RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 577A(4) (1977), quoted in Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1477 n.2.
If a state does not follow the single publication rule, the plaintiff must bring a
separate action each time and in each state where the defamatory statement is pub-
lished for damages suffered within that state. Although such a result is rare, at least
one modern decision explicitly rejects the single publication rule. See Lewis v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 162 Mont. 401, 406, 512 P.2d 702, 704 (1973) ("Despite the numerical
weight of authority following the single publication rule, we consider it unsound.").
82 See, e.g., Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 133-136 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364, 365
(D. Mass. 1940).
84 For example, some territorialist courts have applied the law of the plaintiff's
domicile while others have applied that of the state of the defendant's "act." See gener-
ally Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 VAND. L. REv. 447, 454-456
(1953); Prosser, supra note 65, at 971-978.
88 See Prosser, supra note 65, at 971.
88 See Leflar, supra note 84, at 456; Prosser, supra note 65, at 977.
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 150 (1971).
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Restatement's territorialist approach. Instead, it prescribes considera-
tion of various policies, directing courts to apply the "law of the state
which, with respect to [the particular] issue, has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties."88 Yet, the policies listed
for consideration89 are sufficiently general to enable different courts to
manipulate them easily and thus reach different conclusions on the
choice of law issue in identical cases.
In the context of multistate defamation actions, the Restatement
(Second) reduces the likelihood of conflicting decisions by providing di-
rectives that the state with the most significant relationship will usually
be the plaintiff's domicile if the plaintiff is a natural person or its prin-
cipal place of business if the plaintiff is a corporation or other legal
entity. 90 This suggestion is premised on the rationale that the tort of
defamation is primarily designed to redress injury to a plaintiff's repu-
tation and the greatest injury will usually occur in the state of a plain-
tiff's domicile or place of business. 1
These directives enable courts to avoid a complex balancing of the
factors identified by the Restatement (Second), and many courts follow
them without extensive analysis. For example, in Hanley v. Tribune
Publishing Co.,92 the district court applied the retraction statute of Cal-
ifornia, the defendant's place of business, rather than the law of Ne-
vada, the plaintiff's domicile,93 concluding after careful analysis that
application of the retraction statute would be most consistent with the
policies of both states.94 In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit relied primarily on the general directive of the Restate-
ment (Second), stating that "the contacts specified by the district court
do not warrant deviation from this general rule."95
88 Id. § 145.
89 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) lists the following factors to be considered in
determining the state with the most significant relationship: (a) the needs of the inter-
state and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determi-
nation of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniform-
ity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
See id. § 6. Although procedural rules are generally governed by forum state law, see
id. § 122, even this determination is governed by reference to the above factors, see id.
§ 122 comments a & b. This may at times lead to application of foreign procedural
law. See, e.g., id. § 139 (state with most significant relationship to the communication
may control applicability of evidentiary privilege).
90 See id. §§ 150(2), 150(3).
91 See id., comments e & f.
92 527 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1975).
93 See id. at 70.
9" See id. at 69 (citing lower court opinion).
95 Id. at 70. Similarly, in Reeves v. American Broadcasting Companies, 719 F.2d
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Although exceptions exist,9" it is fair to conclude that the law cho-
sen by most courts following the Restatement (Second) approach will be
the law of the plaintiff's domicile.97 Unfortunately, this choice may
often result not from a critical review of the prescribed policy consider-
ations, but rather from an unconsidered application of the more general
directives.
C. Interest Analysis
Brainerd Currie, the principal champion of interest analysis, ar-
gued that a court faced with a conflicts dispute should first identify the
governmental policies underlying the potentially applicable laws.98 If it
finds that the policies of only one state would be served by application
of its law to the case, that state's law should govern. 9 If, however, the
court finds that the policies underlying the conflicting laws of more
than one state would be furthered by their application, it should first
reconsider the policy implications to see if a more restrained interpreta-
tion of each policy would eliminate the conflict.' 00 Where conflict is
unavoidable and the court faces a "true conflict," however, Professor
602 (2d Cir. 1983), the the Second Circuit, applying New York conflicts law, relied on
the general directive of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) in holding an ABC broadcast to
be privileged under the law of the plaintiff's domicile. Although the Court acknowl-
edged in principle that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) factors should be balanced on a
case-by-case basis, it quickly resolved the matter by stating, "[The trial judge's] factual
determination that Reeves would suffer the most damage to his reputation in his home
state was not clearly erroneous, since the state of the plaintiff's domicile will usually
have the most significant relationship to the case." Id. at 605 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) § 150(2)).
9' See, e.g., Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 523
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania shield law to prevent discovery of a Pennsyl-
vania publisher's sources). In justifying its decision the court stated somewhat con-
clusorily that Pennsylvania had the greatest concern with the issue "because of its con-
tact with, and interest in, the events here in question." Id. at 527. See also Rudin v.
Dow Jones & Co., 510 F. Supp. 210, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (requiring further develop-
ment of factual record to determine choice of law issue).
" See, e.g., Dowd v. Calabrese, 589 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (D.D.C. 1984);
Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364, 1369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying New
Jersey law to New Jersey plaintiff); Fitzpatrick v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 537 F.
Supp. 165, 171 & n.16 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying Pennsylvania law to Pennsylvania
plaintiff); Velle Transcendental Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Esquire, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d
799, 802, 354 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1976) (applying California law to California plaintiff).
98 See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Currie,
Comments on Babcock]; Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 178, reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-84 (1963).
" Currie, Comments on Babcock, supra note 98, at 1242.
100 Id. at 1242-43.
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Currie recommended that forum law be applied."' As a result of the
latter rule, interest analysis tends to favor application of forum law.
As applied by the courts, this approach is not so straightforward.
California courts, for example, use "comparative impairment" to re-
solve true conflicts.'0 2 This entails a determination of "which state's in-
terest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the
policy of the other state" and results in "applying the law of the State
whose interests would be the more impaired if its law were not ap-
plied." 103 Other courts purportedly using interest analysis explicitly
weigh the relevant states' interests'0 and occasionally apply nonforum
law, 0 5 even to such traditionally forum-controlled procedural matters
as statutes of limitation.'0 6 Even when courts supplement pure interest
analysis in such ways, however, the approach retains a distinct prefer-
ence for forum law.1
0 7
Fleury v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 08 a recent defamation
decision by the Ninth Circuit, applying California conflicts law, illus-
trates this preference. Although the case appeared to utilize a weighing
of interests approach (and failed even to mention California's compara-
tive impairment principles), the court explicitly favored the law of the
forum, stating, "Libel and invasion of privacy are transitory torts to
which the law of the forum will normally be applied absent a strong
governmental interest of another jurisdiction."'0 9
While the forum state in Fleury also happened to be the plaintiff's
101 See id.
102 See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320-22, 546 P.2d 719,
723-24, 128 Cal: Rptr. 215, 219-20, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
103 Id. at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
104 See, e.g., White v. Smith, 398 F. Supp. 130, 134 (D.N.J. 1975); Labree v.
Major, 111 R.I. 657, 668, 306 A.2d 808, 815 (1973).
105 See, e.g., White v. Smith, 398 F. Supp. 130, 141 (D.N.J. 1975).
108 See, e.g., Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 37 (3d Cir. 1975)
(applying New Jersey conflicts law to select Quebec statute of limitations); Heavner v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 141, 305 A.2d 412, 418 (1973) (applying North Carolina
statute of limitations).
107 For example, courts may weigh forum state interests more heavily. See, e.g.,
Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 661-74, 306 A.2d 808, 811-18 (1973) (refusing to
apply Massachusetts guest statute to Massachusetts automobile accident because Rhode
Island's interest in allowing recovery for passengers outweighed the Massachusetts in-
terest in protecting drivers from guest suits); see also Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A
Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 43 (1984) ("In almost every case
in which courts have resorted to interest analysis they ended up applying forum law.").
108 698 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 149 (1983).
109 Id. at 1025. The court noted that New York, the defendant's place of business
and the only other state with significant connections to the suit, would have an interest
in the application of its laws for the protection of its residents. The fact that the perti-
nent laws of both states were identical, however, permitted it to avoid consideration of
whether this was an interest sufficient to reject the law of the forum. See id.
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domicile, the law of the forum can easily prevail under interest analysis
when the plaintiff is a nonresident. In a nondefamation case the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court acknowledged that it had no interest in compen-
sating the nonresident plaintiff, yet it chose to apply forum law because
California had an interest in deterring tortious conduct within the
state. 10 In the multistate defamation context the recognition of such an
interest,"" combined with the preference for forum law intrinsic to in-
terest analysis, could easily justify frequent application of forum law in
favor of nonresidents. While the variations of interest analysis, such as
comparative impairment or a weighing of the interests, may make this
result less than certain,112 a forum that adopts this approach will be
quite inviting to plaintiffs who prefer its laws.
D. The "Better Rule" Approach.
The "better rule of law" approach to resolving choice of law con-
flicts issues stems from Dean Robert Leflar's scholarship suggesting
that choice of law issues should be resolved by reference to five
considerations:
(1) predictability of results,
(2) maintenance of interstate and international order,
(3) simplification of the judicial task,
(4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests, and
(5) application of the better rule of law."'
In theory, all five factors should be considered in resolving any
given choice of law issue. However, courts utilizing this approach in
110 See Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 582-84, 522 P.2d 666, 671-72,
114 Cal. Rptr. 106, 111-12 (1974). The decision not to apply a Mexican law, which
limited the amount of damages recoverable, was based in part on the conclusion that
Mexico had no interest in limiting the recovery obtained by its residents from nonresi-
dent defendants. See 11 Cal. 3d at 580-82, 522 P.2d at 670-71, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 110-
11.
11 Cf Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479 (1984) (finding
that New Hampshire's interest in deterring false and defamatory statements within its
borders to be one ground for the state's assertion of jurisdiction).
1"2 See, e.g., Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 35, 37 (3d Cir.
1975) (applying New Jersey interest analysis to select Quebec law); Offshore Rental
Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 167-68, 583 P.2d 721, 727-28, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 867, 873-74 (1978) (comparative impairment analysis resulting in application of
Louisana law).
I" Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 1584, 1586-88 (1966). According to Dean Leflar, rules that appear to be
procedural "ought to be analyzed . . . in terms of the relevant choice-influencing con-
siderations, just as rigorously as other rules of law are analyzed." R. LEFLAR, AMERI-
CAN CONFLICTS LAW 240 (3d ed. 1977).
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tort cases have focused only on the last two.11 4 Consequently, better rule
courts normally apply the law of the forum.'15 Courts use the fifth fac-
tor to justify infrequent exceptions-when they believe, for example,
that foreign law better reflects modern developments."' Illustrative of
this pattern, Minnesota has applied non-Minnesota law only when the
law of another state has been more plaintiff-oriented."
7
Research discloses no instances in which the better rule approach
has been applied to multistate defamation cases. Gravina v. Brunswick
Corp. ,118 however, provides a close analogy; there the court applied the
better rule factors" 9 to a case of invasion of privacy through unautho-
rized publication. Ms. Gravina sued for the unauthorized use of her
photograph in Brunswick's nationwide advertisements.'2 Rhode Island,
the forum state and Ms. Gravina's domicile, did not recognize a cause
of action for invasion of privacy."' Delaware, the state of defendant's
incorporation, and Illinois, the location of its principal business office
from which the advertising presumably originated, did recognize such a
cause of action.' 22 After finding that no state's aggregate interests were
superior or inferior to those of another, the court used the tie-breaking
fifth factor to apply Illinois law because it reflected "the steady trend
toward recognition of the right of privacy . . . across the country."' 23
Gravina is consistent with the trend of Minnesota decisions utiliz-
ing the better rule approach to apply forum law unless another juris-
diction's law is more plaintiff-oriented. Although at least one Wisconsin
decision has deviated from this pattern,24 these cases suggest that better
rule decisions in defamation cases frequently will follow this trend.
114 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 170, 203 N.W.2d 408, 416-17
(1973); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 355-56, 222 A.2d 205, 209-10 (1966). For a
criticism of courts that discount the first three factors, see E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 584 n.16 (1982).
115 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 170-71, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417
(1973); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 356-57, 222 A.2d 205, 209-10 (1966).
"1 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12-13 (Minn. 1981) (tort ac-
tion applying foreign survival statute).
n' See Danforth, Developments in the Minnesota Law of Conflict of Laws, 8 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 785, 785-786 & nn.5-6 (1982).
118 338. F. Supp. 1 (D.R.I. 1972).
11 Although the court did not explicitly state that it was following the "better
rule" approach, the factors it applied were virtually identical to those set forth by Dean
Leflar. See id. at 4.
120 Id. at 2.
121 Id. at 3.
122 Id. at 6.
123 Id. at 6, 7.
124 See Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 610, 204 N.W.2d 897, 908
(1973) (applying law of plaintiff's domicile to bar Wisconsin automobile accident
claim).
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E. Lex Fori
Although interest analysis and the better rule approach will fre-
quently result in the application of forum law, there is sentiment in
some courts to apply forum law in nearly all cases. For example, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has announced that in conflict of law settings
its primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law. 25 As a
result, it appears inclined to apply its law whenever it may constitu-
tionally do so;126 it has stated, "[I]f there are significant contacts-not
necessarily the most significant contacts-with Kentucky, the Kentucky
law should be applied."12 7 Although such a deliberate forum preference
has been characterized as "suspect"' 28 and "ostrich-like," '29 Kentucky
has not shown any sign of retreating from it in tort cases and presuma-
bly will pursue it in defamation cases, even though it has not yet done
so.130
125 See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972).
128 The constitutional limits on choice of law require only that a state have signifi-
cant contacts creating state interests sufficient to justify application of its law. See infra
notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
127 Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972). The Kansas Supreme
Court also appears to have adopted the lex fori approach recently in a class action on
behalf of a nationwide class of plaintiffs. See Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d
1159, 1181 (Kan. 1984) (law of the forum will be applied unless compelling reasons
exist for a different law), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3269 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1984). A
justice of the Michigan Supreme Court has urged that that court take a similar stance.
Concurring in Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843
(1982), in which the court held Michigan law applicable in cases of out-of-state acci-
dents involving Michigan residents, Justice Levin stated, "[W]e should go the distance
and declare that Michigan law will apply in all personal injury and property damage
actions without regard to whether the plaintiffs and defendants are all Michigan per-
sons, unless there is a compelling reason for applying the law of some other jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 442, 320 N.W.2d at 858 (Levin, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
128 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 182 (3d ed. 1977).
129 R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 292 (2d ed.
1980).
130 Kentucky has arguably adopted the most significant relationship approach in
two recent contract cases. See Breeding v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 633
S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky. 1982) (choosing Kentucky law); Lewis v. American Family Ins.
Group, 555 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Ky. 1977) (choosing foreign law). Nevertheless, the
strong preference for forum law has not been questioned in tort cases and Foster v.
Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972), remains valid. See Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc.,
712 F.2d 1069, 1071-73 (6th Cir. 1983) (choosing foreign law in quasi-contractual
claim but stating that "it is apparent that Kentucky applies its own law unless there
are overwhelming interests to the contrary"); Landrum v. Jordan, 565 F. Supp. 90, 92-
93 (W.D. Ky. 1983) (applying Kentucky law to accident involving nonresident plain-
tiff); Kennedy v. Ziesmann, 522 F. Supp. 730, 731-32, (E.D. Ky. 1981) (relying on
Foster v. Leggett, which "clearly stated its preference for the application of Kentucky
law" to apply forum law in malpractice action).
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F. The Interaction of Choice of Law Approaches and Keeton's
Jurisdictional Holding
The foregoing summarizes the principal choice of law approaches
American courts presently follow.13 x Many states, however, use variants
or combinations13 2 of these approaches, and some have moved through a
-succession of tentative theories. 33 Because of the number of approaches
used, generalized statements about prevailing choice of law principles
are difficult. However, the extant approaches suggest that frequent ap-
plication of forum law can be expected in the future. Interest analysis
reflects a distinct preference for forum law. The better rule approach,
as commonly applied, effectuates this preference even more so. And
courts following the lexfori approach will virtually always follow their
own law.
The consequences of Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.'34 for the
multistate media are thus substantial. Not only can plaintiffs obtain
jurisdiction in any forum where the defendant distributes, they can also
expect many such forums to apply their own law. Plaintiffs naturally
will choose the forum whose law will be most favorable to their
claims.13 5 With forum-shopping season therefore open, the issue of
whether there are limitations on choice of defamation law will come to
the fore.
131 Variants of other approaches, such as "principles of preference," see D.
CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 114-224 (1965), and "functional analysis,"
see A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAIJTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 76-79
(1965), have also surfaced in judicial opinions. See Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA
Services, Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 541, 392 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1979) (functional analy-
sis); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 567, 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970) (principles of
preference); see also Kay, supra note 67, at 585.
132 See Kay, supra note 67, at 572. For an example of a court combining ap-
proaches, see Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp 78, 82-84 (E.D. La. 1976) (combining
elements from interest analysis, the most significant relationship test, and the compara-
tive impairment approach).
"I See R. LEFLAR, supra note 128, at 197.
134 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
135 Of course, selecting a forum to obtain the benefits of forum law is not the only
type of forum shopping possible. A plaintiff may also choose a forum because it will
apply nonforum law to her benefit. For example, a New York plaintiff may forego suit
in a New York court that would apply Pennsylvania's speech-enhancing law and sue in
a Pennsylvania court that may apply New York's relatively speech-inhibiting law.
Compare, e.g., Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 523, 527
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania shield law against New York plaintiff) with
Fitzpatrick v. Milky Way Productions, 537 F. Supp. 165, 171-72 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(applying law of state of plaintiff's residence).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CHOICE OF DEFAMATION LAW
A. Generally Applicable Constitutional Constraints
1. The Constraints of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague
The Supreme Court has shown a distinct disinclination to inter-
fere with state choice of law decisions. The last case to hold that a
state's choice of law was unconstitutional was decided in 1947,13 and it
was later discounted as "a highly specialized decision dealing with
unique facts."' 1 7 Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague'38 is the only case
decided in the last twenty years in which the Court has squarely ad-
dressed the issue. Yet, in Hague all eight participating Justices agreed
that the full faith and credit and due process clauses of the Constitution
place some limits on state choice of law decisions. 39
Ralph Hague, a Wisconsin resident, died in an automobile acci-
dent in Wisconsin that involved two uninsured Wisconsin drivers. All-
state Insurance had insured all three of his cars, which were licensed
and garaged in Wisconsin. The policy insured Mr. Hague against acci-
dents with uninsured motorists in amounts up to the stated coverage of
$15,000 for each automobile. His widow, as representative of his estate,
sued Allstate in Minnesota for a declaration that this coverage for each
car could be "stacked" to provide a total coverage of $45,000.4o
The Minnesota courts, applying Minnesota law, issued the decla-
ration, disregarding Allstate's request for application of Wisconsin law,
which did not permit stacking. 41 On appeal the Supreme Court held
that, despite the fact that the accident occurred in Wisconsin, that all
persons involved were from Wisconsin, that the insurance policy was
purchased and delivered in Wisconsin, that the policy covered Wiscon-
sin automobiles, and that the Hagues at the time of the accident lived
in Wisconsin, Minnesota's decision to apply its law did not violate due
process or full faith and credit.'
In reaching this conclusion the plurality and the three dissenters 43
18 See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
137 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964).
138 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
119 See id. at 308, n.10 (plurality opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Black-
mun, JJ.); id. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting,
joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.). Justice Stewart did not participate.
140 Id. at 305-06 & n.21.
141 Id. at 305-06.
142 Id. at 320.
143 The dissent argued for a more specific examination of the state policies impli--
cated by the plurality's significant contacts. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, the dissenters agreed that the plurality opinion set forth appropriate
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agreed that "for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitu-
tionally permissible manner. . . that State must have a significant con-
tact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."144
Applying this test to permit application of Minnesota law, Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality, identified three Minnesota contacts:
Mr. Hague had been a member of the Minnesota work force and had
commuted there daily, Allstate was present and had done business in
Minnesota, and Mrs. Hague had become a Minnesota resident prior to
instituting the litigation, having been appointed representative of her
husband's estate there. 145 The plurality concluded that these contacts
implicated Minnesota state interests in such matters as the safety and
well-being of its work-force,14 its regulation of insurance company ob-
ligations in Minnesota "insofar as they affected both a Minnesota resi-
dent and court-appointed representative . . . and a longstanding mem-
ber of Minnesota's work force,"1' 7 and compensation of its resident
accident victims.1 48 Noting also that Allstate could not claim "unfair
surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations" since it could antici-
pate that Minnesota law might apply to an accident involving an in-
sured Minnesota employee, 49 the plurality held that this "aggregation
of contacts" and the resulting state interests were sufficient to permit
application of Minnesota's stacking rule. 50
Justice Powell, writing for the three dissenters, agreed that All-
state's reasonable expectations were not frustrated by application of
Minnesota law.151 He contended, however, that the plurality's contacts
were "trivial or irrelevant to the furthering of any public policy of
Minnesota" 52 and that it therefore could not apply its law. 53
Only Justice Stevens, who concurred with the plurality, separated
the full faith and credit issue from the due process issue. He stated that
the full faith and credit inquiry should focus on whether choice of a
given state's law "threatens the federal interest in national unity by
basic principles and that "[t]he Court should invalidate a forum state's decision to ap-
ply its own law only when there are no significant contacts between the state and the
litigation." 449 U.S. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 312-13.
145 See id. at 313-19.
141 See id. at 314.
147 Id. at 318.
148 See id. at 319.
149 Id. at 318 n.24.
150 See id. at 320.
151 See id. at 336 (Powell, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 337.
153 Id. at 336.
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unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of another
State."'"' It was obvious to the parties that the insurance policy, cover-
ing accidents in all states, might give rise to application of non-Wiscon-
sin law. Therefore, the contract was not formed in reliance on Wiscon-
sin law, and Wisconsin accordingly had no interest in ensuring that it
be construed consistent with its law.15 5 Because Wisconsin interests
were not threatened, the full faith and credit clause did not preclude
application of Minnesota law.
With respect to the due process inquiry; Justice Stevens stated that
the "desire to prevent unfair surprise to a litigant [is] the central con-
cern . . . . 15 Like the other Justices, he found no serious question of
unfairness to Allstate because of the policy's nationwide coverage. 15
The three Hague opinions share threads of reasoning. To allow a
forum to apply its jurisdiction's law, seven Justices would require sig-
nificant contacts creating state interests, and Justice Stevens would con-
sider whether other states interests were unjustifiably infringed by the
forum's choice of law. In addition all eight Justices deem unfair sur-
prise to be an important consideration in determining whether a state's
law could be applied. Yet, despite these apparent consistencies, several
commentators have argued that Hague has failed to provide guidance
or identify constitutional parameters for choice of law decisions.
158
Scholarly disappointment with Hague has centered on its apparent
lack of standards for determining the significance of contacts or the le-
gitimacy of state interests." 9 Some commentators have characterized
Hague as unprincipled and arbitrary, 60 unsound and filled with argu-
ments amounting to "pure unadulterated foolishness," '' even as an
opinion in which the plurality ignored its stated test." 2 Others have
154 Id. at 323 (Stevens, J., concurring).
155 See id. at 324.
156 Id. at 327.
157 See id. at 329-30.
15I See, e.g., Cavers, Introduction to Symposium: Conflict-of-Laws Theory After
Allstate Insurance v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3 (1981); Hay, Reflections on
Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1644, 1659 (1981); Kozyris, Reflec-
tions on Allstate-The Lessening of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REV.
889, 890 (1981); Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of
Law?, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17, 34 (1981).
151 See Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State
and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1349 (1981).
1"I See von Mehren and Trautman, Constitutional Control of Choice of Law:
Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HoFSTRA L. REV. 35, 43 (1981).
181 Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional
Choice of Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 149, 156, 163, (1981).
182 Hay, supra note 158, at 1659 (arguing that the artificial contacts cited by the
plurality did not reach the level of "significant contacts" under the announced
standard).
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found the result quite appropriate.163
This disparity of opinion results from differing views as to the
appropriate analysis for identifying a state interest sufficient to permit
application of that state's law. One approach, articulated by Justice
Powell in his dissent, defines the requisite interest in specific terms:
"[a] State has a legitimate interest . . . only if the facts to which the
[State's] rule will be applied have created effects within the State, to-
ward which the State's public policy is directed."'" This analysis re-
quires a rather precise identification of the policies the state law in
question reflects and a determination whether those policies would be
advanced within the state by its application. A second approach, advo-
cated by some commentators, views the requisite interest as a general
and perhaps viscerally-discerned one that is premised simply on factual
connections between the state and the litigation. 65
The Hague dissenters would clearly apply the first, more specific
analysis, but it is unclear which approach the plurality followed. Com-
mentators have asserted that the plurality took the second, according a
"broad and undiscriminating meaning to the term 'state interest.' "166
Yet, the language of the plurality opinion suggests that, in determining
the existence of state interests, the in-state effects of the application of a
state's law should be a focus of attention.167 This implies scrutiny be-
yond finding a mere collection of factual connections.
Thus the constitutional limits on choice of law are not clearly de-
fined. However, the debate over the appropriate method of analysis
may be irrelevant in the defamation context because under either ap-
proach a court's decision to apply forum law appears to be permissible.
2. The Implications of Hague in Multistate Defamation
Under either a specific or a general analysis, a state court with
"' See, e.g., Professor Lowenfeld's comments in Lowenfeld & Silberman, Choice
of Law and the Supreme Court: A Dialogue Inspired by Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 841, 842, 860, 863 (1981) (but note that Lowenfeld argued
Hague for the prevailing party); Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law:
The Perspective of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 59, 80 (1981);
Weintraub, supra note 158, at 26.
16 Hague, 449 U.S. at 334 (Powell, J., dissenting).
165 See Sedler, supra note 163, at 72, 74; Weintraub, supra note 158, at 28.
166 Reese, The Hague Case: An Opportunity Lost, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195, 200
(1981). See also Sedler, supra note 163, at 72. Justice Powell, in his dissent, asserted,
"The plurality focuses only on physical contacts vel non . "Hague, 449 U.S. 339-
40 (Powell, J. dissenting).
187 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 315 (noting effect of employee injury or death on Min-
nesota work force); id. at 319 (noting instate financial consequences that might follow
if resident accident victims went uncompensated).
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jurisdiction premised on the Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.16 8 re-
quirement of regular in-state circulation seems, at least superficially, to
have an interest sufficient to justify application of forum law. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Keeton discerned two New
Hampshire interests as partial warrants for its assertion of jurisdiction:
an interest in redressing the in-state portion of the plaintiff's in-
jury-"however small"-and an interest in deterring the deception of
its citizens caused by the defamatory statements."6 9 If a state's defama-
tion laws reflected these interests, they presumably would be advanced
whenever courts applied them in actions against publishers who circu-
lated defamatory materials in the state. The regular in-state circulation
contact would thus seem to implicate sufficient interests to support the
application of the state's defamation law under either mode of analysis.
Indeed, although the Court in Keeton explicitly disclaimed any de-
termination of choice of law issues, 7 its language strongly suggests the
relevance of New Hampshire's governmental interests to the choice of
law decision. For example, the Court stated that "New Hampshire
may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception of its citi-
zens.""' Narrowly defined, these interests of deterrence and compensa-
tion are directed only towards remedying the in-state effects of defama-
tion. Therefore, they would justify application of forum law only with
respect to the in-state portion of a multistate defamation claim. Yet, the
l68 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
16 Id. at 1479. The pertinent language in the opinion is extensive:
[Pletitioner was suing, at least in part, for damages suffered in New
Hampshire .... And it is beyond dispute that New Hampshire has a
significant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the
State . . . . This interest extends to libel actions brought by nonresidents.
False statements of fact harm both the subject of the falsehood and the
readers of the statement. New Hampshire may rightly employ its libel
laws to discourage the deception of its citizens ....
New Hampshire may also extend its concern to the injury that in-
state libel causes within New Hampshire to a nonresident. . . . The rep-
utation of the libel victim may suffer harm even in a state in which he has
hitherto been anonymous. The communication of the libel may create a
negative reputation among the residents of a jurisdiction where the plain-
tiff's previous reputation was, however small, at least unblemished.
New Hampshire has clearly expressed its interest in protecting such
persons from libel, as well as in safeguarding its populace from falsehoods.
Its criminal defamation statute bears no restriction to libels of which resi-
dents are the victim. Moreover, in 1971 New Hampshire specifically de-
leted from its long-arm statute the requirement that a tort be committed
"against a resident of New Hampshire."
Id. (footnotes omitted). Justice Brennan concurred on the ground that these interests
were not crucial to the jurisdictional inquiry. See id. at 1482 (Brennan, J., concurring).
170 See id. at 1480, nn.9-10.
171 Id. at 1479 (emphasis added).
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Court also hinted that use of New Hampshire law to redress nation-
wide injuries may be acceptable. The opinion states, for example,
New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperat-
ing with other States, through the "single publication rule,"
to provide a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and
damage claims arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding.
This rule reduces the potential serious drain of libel cases on
judicial resources. 172
This language implies that concerns for efficiency might justify a
court's application of a single state's law-forum law, for instance-to
the entirety of a multistate defamation plaintiff's claim. This hint
grows louder and more pertinent to the unfair surprise considerations
of Hague when'the Court states, "Certainly Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
which chose to enter the New Hampshire market, can be charged with
knowledge of its laws ... ."'" And after conceding that the bulk of
plaintiff's harm occurred outside New Hampshire, the opinion contin-
ues in a similar fashion:
And, since respondent can be charged with knowledge of the
"single publication rule," it must anticipate that such a suit
will seek nationwide damages. Respondent produces a na-
tional publication aimed at a nationwide audience. There is
no unfairness in calling it to answer for the contents of that
publication wherever a substantial number of copies are reg-
ularly sold and distributed."7 4
One might reasonably infer from this language that the Court
would have little trouble in permitting the application of New Hamp-
shire's libel law to the entirety of plaintiff's nationwide defamation
claim.' "5 New Hampshire's compensation and deterrence interests, com-
bined with its interest in judicial efficiency, may suffice to allow the
state court's choice of forum law to overcome any constitutional hur-
dles. Of course, this reliance on efficiency is questionable, for efficiency
interests historically have been deemed insufficient to justify the avoid-
172 Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
173 Id.
174 Id. at 1481-82.
"I Indeed, the Court appeared to validate forum-shopping in noting that
"[p]etitioner's successful search for a State with a lengthy statute of limitations is no
different from the litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with
favorable substantive or procedural rules or sympathetic local populations." Id. at
1480.
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ance of constitutional limitations.'1 6 Nevertheless, on a superficial level,
this analysis squares with both the plurality and dissenting opinions in
Hague. The circulation of defamatory materials within a state consti-
tutes a contact that has domestic effects-deception and injury to repu-
tation-towards which the policies underlying a state's defamation
rules may be directed. Yet, there are serious questions about the propri-
ety of this result. Holding aside, for the moment, first amendment con-
siderations, this conclusion raises substantial federalism issues.
B. The Constraints of Federalism
Federalism and the tenth amendment generally restrict federal
power to interfere with matters of state concern,177 and they may there-
fore support a recognition of state freedom to apply forum law in con-
flict of law settings. Indeed, Hague's result has been characterized as
substantially extending state autonomy. 78 Yet, unfettered state power
to apply forum law poses a substantial threat to state autonomy.
79
Taken too far, such a practice can destroy the sovereignty of sister
states.
In apparent recognition of this danger, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the full faith and credit clause' 80 to protect state sovereignty
by barring states from refusing, on grounds of their public policy, to
recognize judgments from other states.' 8 ' This prohibition prevents
judgment debtors from frustrating a state's sovereign interest in holding
176 See, e.g., Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of Collateral
Estoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U.L. REv. 383, 425-29 (1983).
17 See U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("[T]he National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways. This . . . is referred to by many as
'Our Federalism' . . . .").
178 See Kozyris, supra note 158, at 896 ("[In terms of result the plurality opinion
• . . and the concurrence of Justice Stevens substantially extend the frontiers of state
autonomy in choice of law.").
179 For example, Wisconsin recently objected to Minnesota's attempts to apply its
laws to Wisconsin businesses. In Hennes v. Loch Ness Bar, 117 Wis. 2d 397, 344
N.W.2d 205 (Ct. App. 1983), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals refused to recognize a
Minnesota judgment imposing dram shop liability for a Minnesota accident on a Wis-
consin bar. The refusal was premised in part on Minnesota's lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. However, the court added, in an apparent reference to Minnesota's attempt to
apply its law, that "Wisconsin has rejected dram shop liability, and Loch Ness was
entitled to rely on this in insuring and conducting its bar business in Wisconsin. Min-
nesota is not entitled to export its public policy to Wisconsin, a coequal sovereign." Id.
at 205 (citation omitted).
180 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
181 See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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them to its judgments by removing their assets to a sister state.1 82
The Supreme Court has been less forceful in requiring states to
recognize the laws of other states than in requiring them to recognize
the valid judgments of other states. Hague itself demonstrates the
Court's willingness to permit a forum state to ignore other states' laws
when it has an interest in applying its own. Notwithstanding this per-
missive approach to choice of law, however, the Court's decisions reflect
two principles that mandate limits on state freedom in this area: (1)
states are coequal sovereigns, and, accordingly, (2) no state's valid in-
terests may be totally subordinated to the will of other states. The
Court's choice of law decisions have assumed that in a given case the
subordination of one state's interests to the interests of another, forum
state will be offset by an equivalent subordination of the latter state's
interests when a case is brought in the former state. Consequently,
through this structure requiring the passive mutual accommodation by
the states of their interests to the interests of forum states, all states are
accorded roughly equal respect in that all have the ability to further
their interests when they are forums-in the aggregate, the subordina-
tion of interests presumably"8 "washes."
In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission,18 4 for example, California was permitted, over a full faith and
credit challenge, to apply its worker's compensation law to an in-state
accident, notwithstanding a Massachusetts statute that restricted the
Massachusetts plaintiff's rights to Massachusetts law "whether within
or without the commonwealth."' 8 5 Addressing the competing claims of
the two states' laws, the Court noted that granting "[flull faith and
credit [to the Massachusetts statute] would deny to California the right
to apply its own remedy . . . . Similarly, the full faith and credit de-
manded for the California Act would deny to Massachusetts the right
to apply its own remedy ... ,, 8' Faced with this dilemma, the Court
sought an appropriate accommodation. Emphasizing California's inter-
est in the bodily safety and economic protection of persons injured
182 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977).
183 But this wash is imperfect because plaintiffs are generally more inclined to sue
in recovery than in nonrecovery states when able to do so. The interests of recovery
states are thus furthered more frequently than those of nonrecovery states. See Kom,
supra note 66, at 781, 791-92. Current limits on choice of law and jurisdiction, how-
ever, will generally make this disparity in the treatment of states less stark than that
which potentially exists in the defamation context. See infra text accompanying notes
184-200. This Article is not intended, however, to support the position that disparate
treatment of states in other contexts is proper.
s 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
185 Id. at 498.
18 Id. at 502.
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within the state, the Court declared, "[T]he full faith and credit clause
does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to
persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state.
187
Sixteen years later, the Court characterized Pacific Employers as re-
quiring that "the State where the injury occurs need not be a vassal to
the home State."' 88 "Were it otherwise," said the Court, "the State
where the injury occurred would be powerless to provide any remedies
or safeguards to nonresident employees working within its borders."' 89
More recently, in Nevada v. Hall,'90 the Court held that Califor-
nia could apply its law to a suit arising from an in-state injury, even
though that law permitted unlimited recovery against the state of Ne-
vada while Nevada law limited recovery to $25,000."' Although the
case dealt largely with sovereign immunity, the Court, in reaching its
decision, described our constitutional system as one of "cooperative fed-
eralism"' 2 and stated,
In this Nation each sovereign governs only with the consent
of the governed. The people of Nevada have consented to a
system in which their State is subject only to limited liability
in tort. But the people of California, who have had no voice
in Nevada's decision, have adopted a different system. Each
of these decisions is equally entitled to our respect.'
93
In these cases, as in Hague, the Court permitted a forum state
with a significant interest in the controversy to apply its law, and, as a
result, the interests of nonforum states were subordinated. Yet, there
was in each case the assumption that each state's subservience was only
partial, for each state's law would be applied and interests furthered
some of the time, at least when that state served as a forum. But it has
never been suggested that the subordination of one state's interests to
another's could be complete. 94 Jurisdictional limitations generally will
187 Id.
188 Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412 (1955).
189 Id. at 414.
190 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
191 Id. at 421-27.
192 Id. at 424 n.24.
191 Id. at 426 (emphasis added). See also Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,
448 U.S. 261, 279 (1980) (plurality opinion) (recognizing "[t]he principle that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to subordinate its own compensation
policies to those of another State ... ").
194 For example, there was no suggestion in Pacific Employers that, had it been
feasible, all citizens of Massachusetts could sue in California to obtain the benefits of
that state's workers compensation laws regardless of where they were injured. There
was no indication in Nevada v. Hall that any Nevada resident could go into California
and obtain the benefits of its law in litigation regardless of where they were injured.
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preclude the possibility that all of a state's citizens may avoid its laws
by suing elsewhere.1 95 And when jurisdiction has existed and forum law
has been applied in favor of nonresidents, the Court has required dis-
tinctive contacts with the forum state, such as employment or the occur-
rence of an injury there, that could not exist in all actions by
nonresidents.
One reason for requiring these distinctive contacts is self-evident.
If any citizen could avoid the limitations of her state's law and obtain
the benefits of another, the legitimate policies of her state, as reflected
by its laws, could be completely overridden. This would destroy the
sovereign rights of that state as much as, if not more than, federal in-
trusion would. In the choice of law, then, the full faith and credit
clause should serve, as it does in the enforcement of judgments,'96 to
ensure the protection of individual state's rights, not only from federal
preemption, but also from total subordination to the laws of other
states.'
97
In the multistate defamation context, this goal will be thwarted by
a constitutional choice of law rule that permits application of the law of
any state of "injury" to the entirety of a plaintiff's claim. Defamation
law primarily redresses damage to reputation,' but such an injury,
unlike injuries that give rise to other torts, is not localized. As Justice
Rehnquist noted in Keeton, "The reputation of the libel victim may
suffer harm even in a state in which he has hitherto been anony-
mous."' 9 Because the injury is not localized, reliance on its presence to
justify application of forum defamation law potentially leaves other
states with no power to apply their defamation laws to the multistate
media operating within their borders. After Keeton, neither jurisdic-
tional limitations nor requirements of distinctive contacts would ensure
application of the state's laws to such entities at least some of the time.
Any plaintiff could avoid those laws by suing in another state of circu-
lation. Consequently, states with relatively speech-enhancing defama-
And there was no indication in Hague that all residents of Wisconsin insured by All-
state could sue in Minnesota to obtain the benefits of its stacking rule.
1 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295
(1980) (in personam jurisdiction improper absent sufficient contacts between defendant
and forum); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (same).
198 Cf. Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 42 (1949) ("It is when a clash of
policies between two states emerges that the need of the [Full Faith and Credit] Clause
is the greatest. It and the statute which implements it are indeed designed to resolve
such controversies.").
197 See generally Hay, Full Faith and Credit and Federalism in Choice of Law,
34 MERCER L. REV. 709 (1983).
"' See Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of
Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1983).
19 Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1479 (footnote omitted).
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tion laws would be placed in a state of vassalage to states with rela-
tively speech-inhibiting defamation laws.
In nondefamation cases the prerequisite of some distinctive state
contacts minimizes the likelihood of such total subordination. Jurisdic-
tional and choice of law limitations will preclude most Wisconsin plain-
tiffs who are insured by Allstate from obtaining the benefits of Minne-
sota law.200 Thus Wisconsin can further the policies reflected by its no-
stacking rule much of the time. Similarly, if Wisconsin chooses through
liability-limiting laws to protect Wisconsin manufacturers that do inter-
state business, it can effectively do so some of the time because jurisdic-
tional and choice of law limitations will preclude most Wisconsin plain-
tiffs from bringing suit in, and obtaining the benefits of the laws of,
other states. But ironically, because a publisher's business is speech,
which can theoretically cause injury in every state, Wisconsin publish-
ers engaged in this traditionally protected activity are potentially sub-
ject, in all cases where they cause injury, to the laws of any state in
which they do business.
This critical point can be clearly illustrated. The people of Indiana
surely have the sovereign right to foster the freedom and success of
their media by requiring that private plaintiffs prove actual malice.
Concomitantly, they have the right to subordinate their own interests in
obtaining compensation for defamatory falsehoods. Their right to fur-
ther these policies surely extends to all publications in the state. Yet, if
in a small Indiana town near the Kentucky border the local newspaper
arguably defames a local resident, would a lawyer doubtful of her abil-
ity to establish the defendant's malice hesitate to bring suit in Ken-
tucky, where the newspaper also circulates? If the suit did go to a Ken-
tucky court, and that court, following Kentucky's lex fori approach,
applied the state's simple negligence rule to the entire case, Indiana's
, policies and interests would be defeated. And this subordination will be
absolute. If Kentucky can and will apply its law, every case in which
Indiana's malice requirement will change the outcome will be brought
in Kentucky. Furthermore, this subordination will not be mutual. Ken-
tucky's compensation policies will never be subordinated to Indiana's
speech-enhancement policies-no sensible Kentucky plaintiff will
forego more favorable Kentucky law to sue in Indiana if application of
the Indiana malice rule would adversely affect her case. Consequently,
200 However slight the contacts required by Hague, the plurality did note that
Allstate's doing business in Minnesota gave Minnesota an interest in regulating its
obligations "insofar as they affected both a Minnesota resident and court-appointed
representative ... and a longstanding member of Minnesota's work force." 449 U.S.
at 318.
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Indiana will be powerless to further its policy decision to protect this
Indiana newspaper.
The same holds true for all media that circulate their products in
Indiana and one or more other states that have speech-inhibiting defa-
mation laws. In every case a plaintiff will be able to obtain the benefit
of another state's more favorable law. If, as the Court stated in Nevada
v. Hall, the sovereignty of each state is equally entitled to respect, it
therefore should be constitutionally impermissible for a state to apply
its law to the entirety of a multistate defamation case simply because
there is in-state circulation, some injury to the plaintiff's reputation in
the state, and some deception of the state's citizens.
Two additional federalism-based concerns also mandate rejection
of a permissive choice of law approach in this context. First, the combi-
nation of this choice of law approach with Keeton's jurisdictional hold-
ing and the forum-shopping propensities of defamation plaintiffs may
effectively federalize multistate defamation laws.20 1 To illustrate, sup-
pose a state that is hostile to the press enacts defamation laws that
grant publishers only those constitutional protections mandated by the
Supreme Court. If that state's courts could and did apply those laws in
all defamation cases against the national media that are brought before
them, all plaintiffs suing the national media for defamation would
bring their claims in that state's courts, unless the differences in the
laws of another state are inconsequential. This would result, in effect,
in the nationalization of defamation law as applied to multistate media,
for in virtually all cases that state's law would control. And because
that state's law would incorporate only those constitutional limits ar-
ticulated by the Court, its application would be tantamount to federali-
zation of defamation law.
Similar consequences may ensue even without this hypothetical
state. A private plaintiff, faced in one state with a pertinent defendant's
privilege, or a difficult burden of proof, would be well-advised to bring
her claim in another state that imposes no such hurdles. That state may
impose other nonconstitutionally-required rules that protect speech but
are not consequential to the plaintiff's case. Therefore, even if no single
state exists whose entire law is reduced to the federal minimum, plain-
tiffs will bring actions only in the states whose laws are at the federal
minimum on the issues pertinent to their claims. In short, a principle
201 To some degree the Court's decisions in the defamation area already appear to
have federalized state defamation law. See Smolla, supra note 198, at 51 ("As the
Supreme Court narrows the scope of its public-figure doctrine, it threatens to contract
the scope of common law privileges below the level to which they would have naturally
evolved had the law of defamation not become constitutionalized.").
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permitting application of state of circulation law potentially subjects the
national media, in any given case, to the law of whichever states have
the most speech-inhibiting laws on the significant issues in that case.
Often, this will be the minimum protection of speech permitted by the
Supreme Court. Such a scheme not only threatens the autonomy of in-
dividual states, but effectively imposes a federal law of defamation on
all the states. Any attempt a state makes to depart from the federal
minimum may be effectively thwarted. Attempted experimental and
pluralistic treatment of the national media would be silenced. While the
federal government surely has some power to regulate the national me-
dia as interstate commerce,20 2 such a result clearly is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's aversion to judicial promulgation of federal law in
areas over which states have traditionally asserted authority.203
The second federalism-based concern that requires rejection of a
permissive choice of defamation law doctrine lies in its threat, to bor-
row the words of Justice Stevens in Hague, to "the federal interest in
national unity. '20 4 Publishers may hesitate before distributing their
product in a state if its relatively speech-inhibiting defamation laws
may be applied to everything they print. A permissive choice of law
doctrine therefore would discourage interstate communication. But na-
tional unity depends upon each state's ability to keep abreast-through
multistate media-of the events, ideas, and trends in other states. The
"robust debate" encouraged by the Supreme Court in its defamation
cases 20 5 must be a national one. To discourage publishers from national
distribution is to foster parochialism and isolationism; it is inimical to
the federal interest in national unity.
206
202 See Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266, 279 (1933).
203 Indeed, "absent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules
of decision," the Court has limited its authority to promulgate federal law to "such
narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States,
interstate and international disputes ...and admiralty cases." Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general common
law."); cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460, 473-75 (1957)
(concurring and dissenting opinions discussing the concept of "protective jurisdiction"
under which congressional authority to promulgate substantive law would imply au-
thority to enact a jurisdictional statute providing a federal forum for enforcement of
state created rights).
201 Hague, 449 U.S. at 323 (Stevens, J., concurring).
205 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
201 Cf Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law
Doctrine, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 806, 814, 824 (1971) (suggesting that principles derived
from commerce clause decisions favor choice of law decisions that best facilitate multis-
tate transactions); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Con-
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For these reasons-respect for state sovereignty, prevention of ef-
fective federalization of defamation law, and avoidance of parochial-
ism-then, a state of circulation with no interests beyond deterrence
and compensation for minor in-state reputational injury should not be
able to apply its defamation law to the entirety of a multistate defama-
tion action.
C. First Amendment Constraints
The preceding arguments focus on federalism concerns and the
full faith and credit clause. First amendment considerations also sup-
port restrictions on a state's ability to apply its defamation law to mul-
tistate defamation actions.
1. Application of First Amendment Analysis to Choice of Law
Decisions.
State action in the form of choice of law decisions ordinarily must
comply with a minimal standard of rationality, an infrequently stressed
constraint of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.207 When
state action impinges on first amendment freedoms, however, its valid-
ity is subject to heightened scrutiny.208 Thus, if the application of defa-
mation laws impinges on these freedoms, the decision to apply them
through a choice of law determination should be subject to these height-
ened standards.
Notwithstanding occasional statements that "[t]here is 'no constitu-
tional value in false statements of fact,' ",209 the Court has unquestion-
ably recognized that defamation laws do impinge first amendment free-
doms. 210 Although heightened scrutiny is therefore required, the Court
stitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1945) (arguing full faith and credit clause was
intended to adapt our legal systems to the needs of a national commerce).
207 See Sedler, supra note 163, at 77-80, 83, 85; see also Kirgis, The Rules of Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 95-97
(1976) (stating that substantive due process imposes choice of law limitations). The
Court's language in Hague clearly indicates the pertinence of this standard. One aspect
of its choice of law test is whether the choice of law is "arbitrary." See Hague, 449
U.S. at 308. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, also raised this as a potential
issue and questioned whether a decision to apply forum law could ever be described as
wholly irrational. See id. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring).
208 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 795 (1978); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see also Sedler, supra note 163, at 77.
209 Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1479 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974)).
20 In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court noted that
"erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to sur-
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has not articulated the precise standard appropriate for review of defa-
mation laws.211 Relatively clear guidelines can be gleaned, however,
from the standards applied in related areas and from the Court's ap-
proach in the defamation decisions.
NAACP v. Button,212 for example, noted that governmental re-
strictions on speech must provide "breathing space, '  a theme that
animates the Court's rulings in the defamation area. In Button the
Court noted that its decisions consistently have required that regula-
tions impinging on speech further a "compelling state interest" 214 and
that they be precise and narrowly drawn.21 5
A more recent decision, Brown v. Hartlage,2"6 states similarly that
any governmental restriction upon false political statements must "be
demonstrably supported not only by a legitimate state interest, but a
compelling one, and . . the restriction [must] operate without unnec-
vive.'" Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). Accord-
ingly, the Court held that states may not award damages for libel in actions brought by
public officials absent proof of actual malice. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283. In
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court applied the New York Times
standard to a criminal libel action brought for criticism of judicial conduct, noting that
"even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure
freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any ex-
cept the knowing or reckless falsehood." Id. at 73. And in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), in which the Court prohibited private plaintiffs from recovery of
presumed or punitive damages except in the case of actual malice, see id., at 349, the
Court noted that "[tihe largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages
where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability
for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment free-
doms." Id. The Court recognized that "tension necessarily exists between the need for
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful
injury." Id. at 342. Despite Justice Rehnquist's dicta in Keeton, these cases show that
the Court has consistently protected defamatory speech, at least when made without
malice, and has recognized that defamation laws do impinge on protected speech.
Heightened scrutiny should therefore be required, for "[w]hatever is added to the field
of libel is taken from the field of free debate." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272
(quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
678 (1942)). Not only can successful libel actions be financially devastating to media
outlets, resulting in a clear chilling of protected speech, but the legal fees incurred in
defamation litigation can also have a substantial chilling effect. See generally, Smolla,
supra note 198, at 12-14.
211 Professor Stone has noted that the Court appears to apply different standards to
judge restrictions on different types of "low-value" speech. Although he considers false
statements of fact to have low first amendment value, he does not describe any stan-
dards applicable to defamatory speech. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 194-95 (1983).
212 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
213 Id. at 433.
214 See id. at 438.
215 See id. at 433, 438.
216 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
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essarily circumscribing protected expression."2 " In Brown the Court
applied this test in determining that Kentucky could not hold a political
candidate criminally responsible for violation of the Kentucky Corrupt
Practices Act,2 1 which bars candidate campaign promises to serve for
reduced compensation.219 The Court characterized the Act as directly
restricting the offer of ideas by a political candidate and held that such
a law triggers the stated test.220 One argument the Court addressed was
that, because the candidate could not legally have fulfilled his promise,
it was a demonstrable falsehood that Kentucky had an interest in
preventing.2 2' Although the Court noted that the state interest in pro-
tecting the political process from distortions is "somewhat different"
from the interests furthered by defamation law, the Court held that
sanctions were impermissible absent the showing required by New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan222-knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth.223
Like the Kentucky statute, defamation laws tend to restrict directly
the offer of ideas. In New York Times the Court observed that "[t]he
fear of damage awards . . . may be markedly more inhibiting than the
fear of prosecution under a criminal statute. ' 224 Logic thus suggests, as
does the Court's analogy to defamation cases in Brown, that the appli-
cation of defamation laws by a state should be subject to the same stan-
dard. A state must have a compelling interest effectuated by a narrowly
tailored law that does not unnecessarily circumscribe protected expres-
sion, at least when the defamation involves politically-oriented expres-
sion like that present in Brown.2 25
A strong argument can be made that this standard should also ap-
ply when the defamation involves nonpolitical expression. The first
amendment's protection is not limited to political speech, 226 and the
217 Id. at 53-54.
215 Ky. REV. STAT. § 121.055 (1982).
219 See Brown, 456 U.S. at 50.
220 See id. at 53-54.
221 See id. at 60-61.
222 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
223 See Brown, 456 U.S. at 61.
224 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277.
225 See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (where restric-
tion is directed toward "speech .. .intimately related to the process of governing,"
compelling state interest and narrowly drawn restrictions are required).
226 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (protecting commercial speech). The analogous history of
commercial and defamatory speech makes application of the commercial speech stan-
dards arguably appropriate to nonpolitical speech in the defamation context. Until re-
cently, neither commercial speech nor defamatory speech were thought to have any first
amendment protection. Compare Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952)
(libelous speech not protected) and Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)
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Court has questioned the wisdom of judicial determinations as to "what
information is relevant to self-government." '27 And its requirement that
public officials prove more fault than private defamation plaintiffs does
not necessarily imply that a lower standard of scrutiny is applicable to
state sanctions on defamations of 'the latter. The Court holds public
officials and public figures to higher standards of proof in defamation
(commercial speech not protected) with Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (commercial speech pro-
tected) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-50 (1974) (delineating first
amendment restrictions on defamation laws).
Modern cases in both areas have emphasized that one reason for the current pro-
tection of both commercial and defamatory speech is to ensure that more clearly pro-
tected speech is not impinged upon. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981) (striking down ordinance prohibiting outdoor advertising
displays); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
562 (1980) (finding ban on promotional advertising unconstitutional because it unnec-
essarily suppressed more protected speech); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
783 (1978) ("[O]ur commercial speech cases . . . illustrate that the First Amendment
...prohibit[s] government from limiting the stock of information from which mem-
bers of the public may draw."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)
("The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964)
("[Ejrroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . must be protected'if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ...to sur-
vive.' ") (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). This history of parallel
reasoning suggests that common standards of review may be appropriate.
Even if the commercial speech standards are applied, however, a more discriminat-
ing analysis than was applied in Hague is still required to determine whether legiti-
mate state interests are furthered. Commercial speech cases require that governmental
restrictions on speech be based on a "substantial" state interest, that they directly ad-
vance that interest, and that they be no more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566. Two additional prerequisites for com-
mercial speech protection are that the speech concern lawful activity and that it not be
misleading. Id. at 566. Because defamatory statements are by definition false, this last
prerequisite should be inapplicable to the defamation context. Its application would
defeat first amendment protection and would be inconsistent with cases limiting state
restrictions on defamatory speech. The requirement is particularly suited to the com-
mercial speech context alone because commercial speech is more easily verifiable by its
disseminator and may be more durable. The Court stated that these attributes make
toleration of inaccurate statements less necessary in the commercial speech context. See
Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24 (1976).
Indeed, because laws restricting noncommercial speech may chill free expression
more than laws restricting commercial speech, the more stringent standards suggested
in the text appear to be more appropriate in the defamation context than do the com-
mercial speech standards. See Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 777 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (speech-intrusive laws are less chilling to commercial speech). In addition a
higher standard of scrutiny for laws imposing sanctions on defamatory speech would be
consistent with other cases proscribing governmental restrictions on "low-value" speech.
Compare Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating prior restraint of de-
famatory speech) with Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (validating prohibitions
of noninformative commercial speech).
2217 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (quoting Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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cases largely because they are likely to have better access to the media
in order to counteract and redress the defamation.228 Thus the Court's
allowance of relatively speech-inhibiting rules in private defamation ac-
tions229 does not mean that a different standard of scrutiny is required.
Rather, relatively speech-inhibiting rules simply may be seen as more
necessary to effectuate the state interest in redressing defamatory injury
because of private plaintiffs' inability to obtain redress by other means.
Upholding relatively speech-inhibiting rules in this context is therefore
consistent with the standard. Thus the requirement that defamation
rules be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, suggested
in the context of political statements by Button and Brown, is logically
applicable to sanctions on any form of defamation.230
While the Supreme Court has not specifically adopted this or any
other test in its defamation decisions, such a standard is consistent with
the language and approach of these decisions. They indicate that the
Court judges the constitutionality of defamation laws by examining
whether their application effectuates strong state interests without un-
necessarily or unduly circumscribing protected speech. In Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc.,2" 1 for example, the Court characterized the state inter-
est in compensating private plaintiffs for actual damages as
"legitimate"232 and "strong and legitimate" 233 and invalidated awards of
presumed damages because they furthered no "substantial" state inter-
est.2"4 It limited the availability of presumed and punitive damages on
the ground that state remedies for defamation could reach "no farther
than is necessary to protect the legitimate [compensation] interest in-
volved."' 235 Similarly, New York Times stressed that laws allowing truth
alone as a defense would deter criticism, suggesting that laws of this
nature are not sufficiently narrowly tailored and unduly limit protected
228 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
229 Compare id. at 347 (private plaintiffs can recover actual damages on showing
of fault) with New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (public officials can recover only
with showing of actual malice).
230 But ef. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (Society's interest in protecting erotic materials "is of a wholly different and
lesser magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate ... .
231 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
232 Id. at 341, 349.
233 Id. at 348.
234 Id. at 349. The Court's use of "substantial" instead of "compelling" is proba-
bly without significance. In In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 & n.9 (1973), de-
cided one year before Gertz, the Court applied a similar standard in an equal protec-
tion case. There, the Court noted that the requisite state interest had been described as
"overriding," "compelling," "important," or "substantial" but that no significance
ought be attached to these semantic variations.
235 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
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expression.'"
These cases indicate, then, that first amendment principles require
close examination of the state interests offered to justify application of
defamation rules and that their application must be narrowly tailored
to further those interests. Defamation rules may be applied no more
extensively than is necessary to protect those state interests deemed suf-
ficiently strong to justify intrusion on speech. Applied to the multistate
defamation context, these requirements may frequently prevent appli-
cation of a state's speech-inhibiting law to a claim for nationwide
damages.
Before discussing the application of this standard in more depth,
however, a potential objection to its use in the conflict of laws setting
warrants exploration. The objection is that potentially applicable state
laws already incorporate the Supreme Court's limitations on defama-
tion laws and that there is thus no need to scrutinize the permissibility
of their application a second time in the interstate context. Stated dif-
ferently, one might argue that the Court has already considered the
potential threat to first amendment activity posed by these laws and
that reconsideration of these concerns in the conflicts setting would con-
stitute a "double counting" that the Court has declined to pursue.
2 37
One response to this objection is based on the fact that if substan-
tive defamation rules, valid because they further strong state interests,
may be applied only when in fact they do so, a certain number of defa-
mation awards entailing certain amounts of damages will follow. If
these rules may also be applied when their application does not further
strong state interests, however, the proclivities of forum shopping plain-
tiffs to avoid states with strong state interests but with relatively
speech-enhancing defamation rules will result in substantially greater
numbers and amounts of defamation awards against the interstate me-
dia. Increased liability, resulting in the demise or decreased vitality of
some publications, will enhance the extant chill on protected speech.2"'
236 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
237 See Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984). In Calder, decided the same day
as Keeton, the Court rejected an argument that the first amendment constrained a
state's ability to assert personal jurisdiction over a defamation defendant, stating,
"[T]he potential chill on protected First Amendment activity stemming from libel and
defamation actions is already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the
substantive law governing such suits. To reintroduce these concerns at the jurisdictional
stage would be a form of double counting." Id. at 1488 (citation omitted).
23. Professor Frederick Schauer, apparently the originator of the double counting
objection, premises it primarily on the notion that limitations on substantive defamation
laws are designed to provide a buffer zone of strategic protection against the erroneous
penalization of protected speech. See Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REV. 685, 704-14 (1978). If this premise
were the full explanation for the Court's limitations, any state's application of rules
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In addition, freely applied forum-oriented conflicts rules will further
curb the media because of the uncertainty they would introduce into
publishing. For example, publishers' inability to predict the applicabil-
ity of privileges recognized by states most closely connected with their
stories would make it more difficult for them to structure their day-to-
day operations in an efficient and effective manner.23 9
The constitutionality of these added threats to freedom of the
press-absent from the intrastate context-have not come before the
Court, and they should not be dismissed by noting conclusorily that the
substantive law any state will apply presumably will be consistent with
the Court's previously announced limitations on defamation law. The
cases just discussed illustrate that identification of the permissible level
of chill on speech has not been simply a matter of ad hoc bright line
drawing that has been finalized from hence forward. Rather, it has
been a function of a balancing of factors-primarily the strength of the
state interest underlying the law in question against the threat to first
amendment values.240 Absent a clear repudiation of this balancing ap-
that provide this buffer zone arguably would not be impermissible under the first
amendment because the application would not increase the risk of erroneous penaliza-
tion beyond that which the Court has deemed acceptable. The Court's limitations on
substantive defamation laws, however, are premised on more than simply providing
such a buffer zone. This is illustrated by the Court's refusal to permit the imposition of
punitive damages for negligent defamation of private persons. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). This limitation, viewed in light of the fact that
actual damages may be awarded in such contexts, does nothing to decrease the risk of
erroneous sanctions on protected speech. This limitation, rather, serves a distinct func-
tion of limiting the level of permissible sanctions to that which furthers strong state
interests, see infra text accompanying note 252, presumably to avoid unnecessarily chil-
ling the effective continued activity of protected speech. Thus consideration of the en-
hanced liability chill discussed in the text is perfectly consistent with the Court's deci-
sions. Indeed, in light of the dangers posed to the continued viability of the press by the
size of recent defamation awards, this consideration is perhaps now more warranted
than it was when Gertz was decided. See, e.g., Of Reputation and Reporters, TIME,
March 19, 1984, at 64, 64 (noting the potential bankruptcy of newspapers because of
defamation judgments). Consideration of this form of chill is also consistent with Pro-
fessor Schauer's more general view that a "chilling effect occurs when individuals seek-
ing to engage in activity protected by the first amendment are deterred from doing so by
governmental regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity." Schauer,
supra, at 693.
... Cf Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 828-29 (1974) (noting that, if Virginia
and other states with minimal interests applied to interstate publications their criminal
statutes prohibiting publication of advertisements that were legal in the advertiser's
state, "[t]he burdens thereby imposed on publications would impair, perhaps severely,
their proper functioning").
240 Even Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), which rejected a constitutional
privilege for editorial processes, is consistent with this approach. Although the Court
there discounted the constitutional significance of more frequent liability, absent the
privilege, for defamation not protected by its previous decisions, see id. at 172, it
reached its conclusion by stressing the difficulties that the privilege would pose to the
redress of damage to an individual's reputation, "as reflected in the laws of defamation
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proach by the Court, speech-inhibiting defamation rules not previously
before it deserve similar consideration.241
A more fundamental response to the double counting objection is
that the cases just discussed affirm a principle that is independent of
any double counting concerns: the state-any state-may not inhibit
speech without significant justification.2 2 This principle expresses this
nation's aversion to governmental meddling with free speech.243 The
values underlying it and the virtue of consistency require its application
in all contexts, absent a compelling reason to depart. None is apparent
in the conflict of laws setting,2 44 and the double counting objection
should therefore fail.
of all the states," id. at 169-70, and contrasted its view that the countervailing constitu-
tional dangers were minimal, see id. at 171-74.
241 One might argue that the double counting objection in Calder v. Jones, 104 S.
Ct. 1481, 1488 (1984), repudiates the Court's allegiance to a balancing approach. See
supra note 237. But jurisdictional rules, standing alone, should not affect the decision
whether the defendant's conduct will be sanctioned. The fact that this question is left in
part to the choice of law determination may explain why the Court in Keeton explicitly
stated that the choice of law issue was a separate question. Because the consequences of
widespread jurisdiction on a defendant's ultimate liability are at least theoretically al-
most nonexistent, the jurisdiction cases may be seen as instances in which the chill on
speech is unaffected, at least in the senses previously deemed important by the Court.
Thus double counting may well have been an appropriate characterization of the first
amendment argument in these jurisdictional cases. Because of the existence of the forms
of chill noted in the text, however, it would not be appropriate to invoke the objection
in the choice of law context.
242 In some contexts, of course, speech may be totally protected.
243 See, e.g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270 (recognizing "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials").
244 The only arguable justification seems to be respect for state autonomy and sov-
ereignty. As earlier portions of this article have shown, however, a permissive conflicts
rule would in fact pose substantial dangers to these values.
Another reason for imposing heightened scrutiny on defamation choice of law rules
is that a rule permitting application of the law of any state in which a publisher circu-
lates materials is discriminatory against the press. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), the Court struck down as
inconsistent with the first amendment Minnesota's use tax on the cost of paper and ink
products consumed in publishing. Because the tax singled out the press for special
treatment, the Court held it could not stand unless it was "necessary to achieve an
overriding governmental interest," which it was not. See id. at 582, 591-92. Other types
of national businesses are not, under current law, subject to the laws of all states in
which they do business for any injury their products cause. Should a state apply its law
to the out-of-state portion of a plaintiff's defamation injuries but refuse to apply its law
to remedy out-of-state injuries caused by nonpress businesses operating in the state, it
would be engaging in discrimination similar to that rejected by the Court in Minneapo-
lis Tribune.
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2. Application of Heightened Scrutiny and the Invalidity of
Deterrence as a State Interest
First amendment principles thus mandate that a state may apply
its defamation rules only in a manner narrowly tailored to further
strong state interests. In the multistate defamation context a court's de-
cision to apply forum law to the entirety of a plaintiff's nationwide
defamation claim would not meet this test if the plaintiff had only neg-
ligible connections to the state. Although the forum state may, accord-
ing to Keeton, have a valid interest in redressing injuries within the
state if the plaintiff's reputation suffered harm there, 45 application of
its law to redress injuries suffered in other states where the harm is not
legally cognizable may result in compensation highly disproportionate
to this interest. The forum state law's speech-inhibiting reach would
extend far beyond that necessary to further its underlying state interest,
violating the first amendment requirement that it be narrowly tailored.
One might argue, however, that application of forum law in this
context would further the second state interest mentioned in Kee-
ton-deterring deception of a state's citizens.2 46 While the requirement
that a statute be narrowly tailored may mandate that this interest be
asserted only in a manner proportionate to the harm done within the
state, again precluding application of forum law to redress harm
outside the state, a more extensive and arguably punitive application of
liability-creating forum law would presumably amplify the law's deter-
rent effect. Thus, if this interest is strong and valid, application of fo-
rum law to the entirety of a claim by a state with only a small portion
of the defendant's circulation might be consistent with first amendment
considerations. However, additional first amendment principles indicate
that this state interest is insufficient, at least for purposes of sanctioning
nonmalicious defamation.
When the Supreme Court prohibited liability without fault and
presumed or punitive damages absent malice in Gertz, it specifically
purported to accommodate first amendment interests with the interests
underlying state defamation laws,247 and it made clear that state inter-
ests in deterrence and punishment were insufficient to justify sanctions
upon nonmalicious defamation. Rather, the primary, and perhaps the
only, state interest that could justify the imposition of liability was com-
pensation for actual harm. According to the Court, "The legitimate
state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individ-
245 See Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1479.
246 See id.
247 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
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uals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. '2 48 Recov-
ery by private persons on a showing of fault was allowed by the Court
"in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest in compensat-
ing private individuals for injury to reputation. '249 And the Court im-
plicitly discounted the legitimacy of other state interests when it limited
the extent of permissible damage awards by declaring that "this coun-
tervailing state interest extends no further than compensation for actual
injury."25 0 Moreover, in holding punitive damages impermissible absent
malice, the Court explicitly rejected the legitimacy of any state interest
in punishment or deterrence of negligent defamation. 51 The Court
stated that "punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest
that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions. They
are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied
by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence."
252
Thus the Court's accommodation of interests in Gertz clearly indi-
cates that deterrence and punishment are not valid state interests when
asserted to justify sanctions against nonmalicious defamation. Perhaps
valid with respect to other forms of tortious conduct, they are not suffi-
cient to justify liability in the face of first amendment commands. 53
The Court's treatment of the deterrence interest as a valid one in
Keeton conflicts with its proclamations in Gertz. It is therefore not sur-
prising that the authorities cited in Keeton in reference to that interest
seem slightly off the mark. For instance, the case cited as illustrative of
New Hampshire's interest in deterrence was a conversion case, not a
defamation case. 25" Because both conversion and defamation are tort ac-
tions, Justice Rehnquist simply transferred the deterrence interest im-
248 Id. at 341.
249 Id. at 348-49.
250 Id. at 349.
251 See id.
252 Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
253 See id. at 349-50. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the Court sug-
gested that deterrence is a recognized interest underlying defamation laws. See id. at
172. However, the plaintiff in Herbert conceded that he would have to show malice to
recover. See id. at 156. The Court appeared to limit its recognition of an interest in
deterrence to the context of defamation made with actual malice, a qualification not
inconsistent with the implications of Gertz. See, e.g., Herbert, 441 U.S. at 172 ("Those
who publish defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability . . .are subject to
liability, the aim being not only to compensate for injury but also to deter publication of
unprotected material . . . . If such proof results in liability for damages which in turn
discourages the publication of erroneous information known to be false or probably
false, that is no more than what our cases contemplate and does not abridge either
freedom of speech or of the press.") (emphasis added).
254 See Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 298, 319 A.2d 626, 629 (1974), cited in
Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1479.
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plicit in conversion to the defamation context, apparently without con-
sideration of the significantly different effects each tort has on first
amendment freedoms.255 In addition, the New Hampshire criminal def-
amation statute cited as expressing New Hampshire's interest in deter-
rence applies only to statements known to be false, statements for which
Gertz suggested deterrence and punishment may be valid.256
Keeton's recognition of the legitimacy of a state's interest in deter-
ring negligent defamation is inconsistent not only with Gertz but also
with other strands of first amendment doctrine. First, a distinctively
punitive motive seems to be present when a court awards dam-
ages-through application of forum law-that may be highly dispro-
portionate to the forum state's interest in compensating in-state injuries,
especially when the injuries redressed are not legally cognizable in
other states. Such awards appear not only inconsistent with Gertz's
prohibition of punitive damages in the absence of malice, but they
breach the limits that the Court has imposed on a state's power to pun-
ish defamation through criminal libel laws. In the criminal libel area
the Court has traditionally identified the deterrence of violence as the
principal public interest underlying defamation laws. Even assuming
this interest retains vitality-a doubtful assumption-state efforts to
further this interest are nevertheless limited.
The last Supreme Court decision to uphold the application of a
criminal libel statute was Beauharnais v. Illinois,257 a five-to-four deci-
sion handed down in 1952 in which the Court upheld a conviction for
the distribution of inflammatory racist literature. 5 8 Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Frankfurter focused on the social strife and violence that
Illinois historically had experienced because of defamatory statements
similar to the one at issue in the case.259 In light of this history, he
stressed the state interest in deterring violence and upheld the convic-
tion.260 Twelve years later, in Garrison v. Louisiana,2 61 the Court
255 See Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1479.
256 See id. at 1479 & n.6 (quoting N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 644:11 (1974)).
25" 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
258 See id. at 252.
259 See id. at 258-61.
260 In the face of this history and its frequent obligato of extreme racial and
religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say that the Illinois
legislature was without reason in seeking ways to curb false or malicious
defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public places and by
means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those to whom it
was presented. "There are limits to the exercise of these liberties [of
speech and of the press]. The danger in these times from the coercive ac-
tivities of those who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would
incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of their
equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by events famil-
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unanimously overturned a conviction under the Louisiana criminal libel
statute, holding that the statute must incorporate the then-recently an-
nounced standards of New York Times. In the course of its opinion, the
Court stressed that the traditional purpose of criminal libel laws has
been "to avert the possibility that the utterance would provoke an en-
raged victim to a breach of peace."2 2 Strongly questioning the continu-
ing validity of this justification for modern criminal libel laws, the
Court concluded that a criminal libel statute could not stand unless it
required a showing that the defamation was calculated to and would
create a clear and present danger of a breach of the peace,263 and it
forbade imposition of criminal liability for nonmalicious defamations of
public officials.264
There is no indication in these cases that Keeton's suggested state
interest in discouraging deception of a state's citizens, standing alone, is
a legitimate public justification for the sanctioning of defamation.
Rather, the permissibility of public sanctions turned on the probability
that the statements would cause more tangible violent harm. And the
probability that violence will be triggered by a defamatory statement in
a state with which the plaintiff has no significant connection is virtually
nil. Thus, to permit any state in which a defendant circulates a publi-
cation to impose sanctions on defamation so as to further a state interest
in deterrence would be inconsistent with the Court's established doc-
trine on criminal defamation laws.
Recognition of any legitimate state interest in deterrence of decep-
tion is also at least philosophically inconsistent with the doctrine of
prior restraint. The landmark decision prohibiting prior restraint, Near
Jar to all. These and other transgressions of those limits the States appro-
priately may punish ...
It may be argued, and weightily, that this legislation will not help
matters; that tension-and on occasion violence between racial and religious
groups must be traced to causes more deeply imbedded in our society than
the rantings of modern Know-Nothings .... [But] it would be out of
bounds for the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided
it is not unrelated to the problem . ...
Id. at 261-62 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310
(1940)).
Professors Nowak, Rotunda, and Young have stated, "Although Beauharnais v.
Illinois has never been explicitly rejected, it is unlikely to represent present law in light
of New York Times v. Sullivan. . . ." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 944 (2d ed. 1983) (footnote omitted).
261 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
262 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 68.
263 See id. at 70.
2S See id. at 77-79.
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v. Minnesota,26 forbade prior restraint of precisely the type of speech
with which this Article concerns itself-defamatory speech. Voiding an
injunction against the distribution of a "malicious, scandalous and de-
famatory newspaper, '  Chief justice Hughes, writing for the Court,
stressed that "[t]he statute [under which the injunction was issued] is
not aimed at the redress of individual or private wrongs.11 67 Rather,
"[t]he object of the statute is . . .suppression of the offending newspa-
per or periodical."26
Deterrence is prevention, and prevention is, in effect, prior re-
straint. Although less direct in form than an injunction, the concept is
the same. Scandal sheets of the sort Near protected from suppression
provided information not provided by more established publications tied
to politicians or the business world. 26 9 Massive defamation awards pre-
mised on a deterrence interest may suppress small publications that
serve a similar role just as much as the injunction voided in Near did.
As a practical matter Near rejected the state's efforts to "discourage the
deception of its citizens" through deterrence of defamation before the
fact. With few exceptions, 70 judicial aversion to prepublication govern-
mental intrusion in speech has been unwavering.71 The notion that the
government has an interest in protecting citizens from speech, even de-
ceptive speech, is anathema to a democratic society. The role and inter-
est of the government has therefore traditionally been limited to provid-
ing compensation only after defamatory statements have caused injury.
Thus, espousing a state interest in deterring deception is inconsis-
tent with several strands of first amendment precedent. Its pertinence
265 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
266 Id. at 706.
267 Id. at 709.
288 Id. at 711.
28 See Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historical Developments, 66
MINN. L. REv. 95, 135-36 (1981).
270 In Near, Chief Justice Hughes noted three "exceptional cases" where prior
restraints might be permitted: (1) statements interfering with a war effort, (2) obscen-
ity, and (3) statements inciting violence. See Near, 283 U.S. at 716. The interest in
deterring violence noted in connection with criminal defamation statutes is not inconsis-
tent with Near in light of the third exception.
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), exemplifies an additional exception in
permitting restrictions on purely noninformative commercial speech such as trade
names. See id. at 12 (noting that trade names convey no information until they acquire
meaning over time).
271 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(holding unconstitutional a Florida statute that guaranteed political candidates equal
space to reply to 'criticism); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(denying injunction against publication of the Pentagon Papers); see also Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936) (First and fourteenth amendments pre-
clude state and federal governments "from adopting any form of previous restraint
upon printed publications, or their circulation . . . .") (emphasis added).
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and strength in the conflicts setting is therefore suspect. This interest,
particularly in light of the constitutional concerns noted earlier, does
not justify a court's application of forum law to the entirety of a plain-
tiff's nationwide defamation claim when that plaintiff has only minimal
connections to the forum state. At most, its force should be deemed pro-
portionate to the in-state harm caused by the defamation, serving to
validate a state's compensating the plaintiff for the harm incurred
within the state.
Compensation for injury, then, is the only strong state interest that
justifies a state's choice of defamation law decision that impinges on
first amendment freedoms. The first amendment demands that such a
decision be narrowly tailored to further that interest. The substantiality
of a state's interest in providing such compensation, therefore, should be
the touchstone when assessing the permissibility under the first amend-
ment of forum law application in the conflicts setting. Among other
things, the next Part focuses on the requisite strength of this interest.
IV. DEVELOPING A MODEL FOR THE CHOICE OF LAW IN
MULTISTATE DEFAMATION CASES
A. The Choice of Substantive Defamation Law
The foregoing federalism and first amendment principles indepen-
dently mandate that a state whose only connection with a multistate
defamation action is the defamatory publication's circulation within the
state's borders ought not apply its law to the entirety of the plaintiff's
claim. The application of forum law in such cases potentially nullifies
the sovereignty of sister states with relatively speech-enhancing laws,
makes more likely the practical federalization of multistate defamation
law, and discourages interstate publication. In addition, application of
forum law in these circumstances unjustifiably infringes on first
amendment freedoms.
Yet, the question of what law may be applied in the multistate
defamation context remains. Requiring a court to divide up the claim
and apply the law of each state of circulation only to the extent neces-
sary to compensate for the harm done in that state is unsatisfactory.
But this is not the only permissible solution. Federalism objections arise
from the possibility that the combination of forum-shopping plaintiffs
and forum-law-applying courts may totally abrogate the interests of
nonforum states with relatively speech-enhancing laws. First amend-
ment objections arise primarily from the possibility that states may ap-
ply speech-inhibiting laws without a strong interest in doing so. Both
sets of objections can be met by prohibiting courts from applying to the
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entirety of a multistate defamation claim any state's law that is more
speech-inhibiting than the law of other states of circulation, unless that
state has a significant interest, relative to the interests of other states, in
compensating the plaintiff. This requirement would focus more on the
actual effects of the multistate defamation experienced by the plaintiff
rather than on intangible damage to her reputation within the states of
circulation.
For example, if a plaintiff lives and conducts most of her activities
in a single state, other states' application of this "home state" law
would satisfy both federalism and first amendment concerns. Applica-
tion of home state law would discourage forum-shopping and respect
sovereign interests. If the home state had relatively speech-enhancing
laws, the interests underlying those laws would be furthered when its
residents brought claims. And application of home state law would not
deter local publications from distributing outside the home state, so in-
terstate publication is not discouraged.
Nor does application of home state law to the entire case infringe
on first amendment values. Even if the home state's laws are relatively
speech-inhibiting, that state has a strong interest in compensating resi-
dent plaintiffs. This interest extends beyond redressing the plaintiff's
in-state loss of reputation. Suffering and humiliation that result from
the defamation plaintiff's loss of esteem elsewhere will be felt most
strongly by her in her home state.27 2 The plaintiff's pecuniary loss, di-
minished economic productivity and reduced civic activity will be felt
primarily there. And, if the effects of her loss of reputation are so dev-
astating that she becomes a public charge or incurs substantial debts for
medical treatment, the resulting burden and debts will most greatly af-
fect the home state. Thus, even though an injury to a defamation plain-
tiff's reputation may be felt nationwide, the home state will bear the
brunt of that injury. Conversely, nationwide vindication through the
plaintiff's success in litigation, resulting in her beneficial interchange
with nonresidents, will enhance her ability to contribute through eco-
nomic and civic activity to her home state. Because of the resulting sub-
stantiality of the home state's interest, the application of its law to the
entire claim would meet the heightened scrutiny mandated by the first
amendment.27 3
2712 Professor Smolla has argued that, notwithstanding the traditional notion that
defamation laws redress injury to reputation, which theoretically may exist everywhere,
"it seems clear that the bulk of the money paid out in damage awards in defamation
suits is to compensate for psychic injury, rather than to compensate for any objectively
verifiable damage to one's community standing." Smolla, supra note 198, at 18-19.
173 In addition there is little likelihood of discrimination against the press through
application of home state law. Other businesses are generally subject to the laws of
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Of course, many defamation plaintiffs conduct substantial activities
in more than one state, and thus the defamation may have significant
effects similar to those just described in several states. Here, application
of any of these states' laws would satisfy all constitutional concerns be-
cause it is only the application of the law of any states of circulation
with only minor compensatory interests that offends constitutional prin-
ciples. These concerns will not be infringed by the potential application
of the law of more than one state if distinctive contacts are required
that prevent the total abrogation of other states' policies and assure that
their interest in compensation is sufficiently strong to satisfy first
amendment concerns. If plaintiffs are limited to the laws of the states
with relatively significant interests in compensation, constitutional con-
cerns will be satisfied.
Care should be taken in establishing a threshold of significance,
however, to assure the sovereignty of states with respect to their border
town publications. The threshold should not be so low to enable all
probable plaintiffs with claims against border town publications to ben-
efit from the laws of contiguous states. Such a low threshold potentially
nullifies the sovereign right of a speech-enhancing state to further its
interests in enhancing the health of such publications. Thus mere ac-
quaintance with persons of another state, which virtually all such
plaintiffs would have, should not satisfy the requisite threshold even
though the defamation may affect relationships with persons there.
Rather, a significant degree of activity in the border state that might be
affected by the defamation should be the minimal requirement for ap-
plication of that state's law. This will assure that a state with speech-
enhancing laws will maintain a degree of co-equal sovereignty, for its
laws will be applied some of the time because not all plaintiffs will
meet such a threshold. As for plaintiffs who do meet the threshold, the
sovereignty of the state of publication may occasionally be required to
accommodate the sovereign interests of other states in defamation cases,
just as in other actions.
These considerations suggest a floor for choice of law decisions.
With respect to any single issue, courts should not apply to the entire
claim any state's law that is more speech-inhibiting than that of a state
with a relatively significant interest in compensating the plaintiff.
These principles, however, would not prevent a court from applying
laws that are more speech-enhancing than those of a state with a signif-
icant compensation interest.
states where they cause localized injury. By "localizing" the defamation injury to a
place where it has a significant effect, the media will be similarly treated.
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For example, if the forum state's law recognizes a privilege not
recognized by the plaintiff's home state law, the forum could, by depe-
cage, apply its law to that issue without infringing on constitutional
values. The forum's choice would be justified by its strong interest in
promoting freedom of speech within its borders. More importantly,
however, recognition of the privilege would not undermine the home
state's sovereignty, for such undermining results from plaintiffs shop-
ping for and obtaining the benefits of speech-inhibiting laws, not
speech-enhancing laws; defamation plaintiffs do not shop for the latter.
Rather, the home state's nonprivilege rule will still be applicable in
suits brought in the home state, and application of the privilege may
well encourage more plaintiffs to bring suit there, effectively enhancing
the home state's ability to promote its policies. Finally, application of a
rule that is more speech-enhancing than that which a court constitu-
tionally could apply should not be considered an infringement on first
amendment values.
Thus, an appropriate accommodation of full faith and credit, fed-
eralism, and first amendment concerns initially requires that, in choos-
ing law applicable to an entire defamation claim, a forum apply the
laws of a state that has a significant interest, relative to the interests of
other states of circulation, in compensating the plaintiff." 4 It may apply
laws no more speech-inhibiting than the laws of that state. However,
after identifying such a state, the forum may apply, through decepage
for example, relatively speech-enhancing rules of other states without
infringing constitutional values.
2174 Federalism concerns require this test, regardless of the defendant's scienter.
One might argue, if not convinced by these concerns, however, that first amendment
limitations protect only nonmalicious defamation and that any state of circulation
should be permitted to apply its law to the entirety of a claim for nationwide malicious
defamation because, in this situation alone, the state retains an interest in punishment
and deterrence.
This analysis would permit any state of circulation to apply its law to the entirety
of the plaintiff's claim in those instances where plaintiffs are constitutionally required
to prove malice as an element of their case-that is, defamation suits against public
officials or public figures. But the choice of law issue becomes more complex if the
plaintiff need not prove malice to recover but alleges its existence in hope, for example,
of recovering punitive damages. By focusing on the fact that an ultimate finding of
malice will determine the permissibility of applying more speech-inhibiting law, a court
can carefully sort out its permissible choice of law options. However, the complexity of
the analysis and the concerns of federalism suggest that the more prudent course would
be for the court to choose to apply a uniform set of laws, such as that of the home state,
whose application will not infringe on constitutional values, regardless of the scienter
found.
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B. The Choice of Procedural Rules
States that apply the substantive law of other states nonetheless
occasionally apply their own procedural rules.2"5 How the constitu-
tional principles discussed above affect the application of procedural
rules remains to be explored.
Most procedural rules are not founded on policies directed towards
freedom of speech or defamation actions; rather, they reflect a state's
general policies toward the resolution of all disputes in its courts.
Where procedural differences between the forum and a state with a
significant compensation interest are not traceable to speech or defama-
tion policies, no issues of constitutional dimension are apparent from
the forum's application of its own procedure. This holds true even if
the forum state's procedural rules are distinctly more favorable to the
plaintiff than those of her home state. The home state's sovereign right
to further its speech-enhancing policies will not be subject to total nulli-
fication because the home state's rules are not based on speech-enhanc-
ing policies but on concerns for the efficiency and integrity of the state's
courts. Suits in other states do not implicate these policies. Although
interstate publication theoretically could be discouraged if circulation in
a state meant that that state's procedural rules will be applied, the ad-
ditional risk will be slight when those rules are not designed to expose
publishers to a greater chance of liability on the merits. The potential
federalization of procedure in multistate defamation cases seems an
equally remote risk. Nor will first amendment considerations be impli-
cated-the principal first amendment concern is that a state may not
apply speech-inhibiting rules absent a strong interest in so doing. If the
forum's procedural rules are not directed towards speech or defamation,
the constitutional implications will normally be slight. " "
Some arguably procedural rules, however, are directed specifically
at speech and defamation cases. Evidentiary privileges against disclos-
ure of sources and special preferences for summary judgment in defa-
mation cases are examples. When states with a relatively significant
compensation interest have such rules and the forum does not, their
application does raise constitutional concerns, particularly with regard
to federalism and the full faith and credit clause. Whenever application
of such rules may change a suit's outcome, all well-advised plaintiffs
will bring suit in states with these favorable procedural rules, thus nul-
2175 See supra notes 71 and 77 and accompanying text.
2'78 Cf Minneapolis Star and Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 582-83 (1983) (the press may be subject to economic regulation that is applicable
to all businesses).
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lifying the other states' speech-enhancing sovereign interests. Although
most forum application of procedural rules is unlikely to deter inter-
state circulation, the application of arguably procedural rules such as a
"nonshield law" rule, which would deny the press a testimonial privi-
lege with respect to confidential sources, may do so. And whenever ap-
plication of such rules does make a difference, any federal minimums of
procedural protection in defamation cases177 will effectively become the
law of the land for multistate defamation. Thus, when a defendant-
favoring procedural rule of a state with a significant compensation in-
terest is predicated on speech-enhancing policies, full faith and credit
and federalism principles demand that a forum without such a compen-
sation interest forego application of its procedural rules.2 78
Perhaps the most difficult procedural issue in this context is
whether a state's statute of limitations may be applied to an entire
claim. Some statutes of limitation do not distinguish between defama-
tion actibns and other torts. 27 ' But some states have adopted statutes of
limitation that apply only to libel and slander actions and that are
uniquely short. 80 In a case in which the plaintiff's home state had
adopted such a statute of limitations-limitations that appear to be in-
tentionally speech-enhancing-the preceding principles would require a
foreign forum to apply the statute.
With respect to more generalized statutes, the Supreme Court, de-
clining in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc."' l to rule on whether New
Hampshire could apply its statute of limitations, noted "considerable
academic criticism" of a forum state's application of its statute of limi-
tations regardless of the significance of litigation contacts with the fo-
rum.2 2 Professor Martin, for example, has argued cogently that under
general constitutional choice of law principles, a forum should not be
permitted to apply its statute of limitations if it is longer than that of
another concerned state unless the forum may constitutionally apply its
substantive law.2" 3 Although the application of a shorter statute may
further the forum state's general interests in reducing docket congestion
" Cf Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that no privilege pro-
tects a reporter's confidential sources from grand jury investigation).
278 Of course, if a state consciously enacts a speech-inhibiting procedural rule, first
amendment considerations may similarly require its surrender.
29 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260 § 4 (West 1983).
280 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 1952).
281 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
282 Id. at 1480 & n.10 (citing R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 9.2B, at 517 (2d ed. 1980); Lorenzen, The Statute of Limitations and the
Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L.J. 492, 496-497 (1919)); Martin, Constitutional Limita-
tions on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185, 221 (1976).
283 See Martin, supra note 282, at 221-23.
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and in rendering decisions based on reliable evidence, similar policies
cannot justify the application of a longer statute of limitations when the
claim is barred in all interested states. s4
This argument is even more compelling in the defamation context.
Even when the home state's statute of limitations is not directed at def-
amation actions, the application of a longer forum statute would com-
pletely abrogate the home state's sovereignty. Multistate media operat-
ing in the home state will always be subject to the other state's longer
statute, thus totally frustrating those home state policies that favor
defendants.28
Furthermore, a forum that refuses to recognize a home state's stat-
ute of limitations but applies its substantive law will be sanctioning the
press through the laws of a state that has disclaimed any strong interest
in their application. In effect, application of the forum's statute of limi-
tations imposes speech-inhibiting laws that would not be applied by
any state with a relatively significant compensatory interest. When the
forum's interest in compensating the plaintiff fails to meet the threshold
necessary for application of its own speech-inhibiting laws, application
of its statute of limitations to the entire case therefore also would not
withstand heightened first amendment scrutiny. Thus, a state without a
significant compensation interest should not be permitted to apply its
longer statute of limitations, even when the shorter statute of a state
with a significant compensation interest is not specifically premised on
speech-enhancing policies.
C. Parceling Out the Claim
To this point this Article has focused on what single state's law
may be applied to the entirety of a multistate defamation claim. Keeton
suggests, however, that a court might divide up the claim and apply
forum law to only a portion. While discussing New Hampshire's inter-
ests, Justice Rehnquist stated, "[Ilt is beyond dispute that New Hamp-
shire has a significant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur
within the state' 28 6 and "New Hampshire may also extend its concern
to the injury that an in-state libel causes within New Hampshire to a
nonresident.
2 87
While this narrow language may suggest concerns on the Court
28 See id.
285 This fact raises both full faith and credit concerns and concerns of discrimina-
tion against the press.
288 Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1479 (emphasis added).
287 Id. (emphasis added).
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with the issues addressed by this Article, it also suggests that the Court
would have no objection if New Hampshire were to apply its law to
redress only that portion of the injury suffered in New Hampshire. A
court inclined to do so consistently within the limits suggested by this
Article presumably would provide jury instructions on New Hampshire
law for the New Hampshire portion of the injury and instructions on
the law of a state with a relatively significant compensation interest for
the remaining portion of the injury. The jury would grant separate
damage awards for each portion of the injury. A court could go further
and have different jury instructions for each state of circulation, to-
gether with different damage awards, each fulfilling the policies of a
given state to the extent that it has a legitimate interest in compensa-
tion. Or even more exciting and debilitating, the court could add in-
structions on the law of foreign countries in which the defaming publi-
cation was circulated.
The spectre of the chaos such approaches would generate arguably
would justify a court's falling back on Keeton's language stressing judi-
cial efficiency as a justification for its application of its law to the entire
claim.2 8 As this Article has shown, however, application of New
Hampshire law to the entire claim would significantly intrude on con-
stitutional values, and interests in judicial efficiency have traditionally
been deemed insufficient to override significant constitutional protec-
tions.2" 9 Efficiency concerns might justify a state's foregoing certain in-
trastate policies, such as those furthered by application of its law to the
intrastate portion of a plaintiff's injury, but they cannot override consti-
tutionally protected sovereign interests of other states or justify in-
fringement of first amendment freedoms.
If a forum wants to apply its relatively speech-inhibiting law to
the in-state portion of the injury, however, the constitutional principles
noted thus far do not clearly preclude it from doing so. Application of
home state law to the remainder of the claim would respect the home
state's sovereignty. Other federalism concerns are not greatly frustrated,
and, assuming there is actual injury within the state, application of fo-
rum law to this portion of the injury appears consistent with first
amendment principles.
Yet, splitting up the claim like this presents a problem that argua-
bly rises to constitutional dimension. Because reputation is intangible,
compensation for its injury defies precise measurement. As a result, ap-
plication of forum law to the in-state portion of a multistate claim poses
288 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
289 See generally Pielemeier, supra note 176, at 425-29.
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the danger that juries will award disproportionate damages for that
portion, thereby inappropriately infringing both the interests of other
states and the first amendment.
For example, if a defendant has made a particularly inflammatory
or unpopular defamatory statement that is legally cognizable only in a
state to which the plaintiff has no significant connections, there is a
danger that the jury, because of its disdain for the defendant and its
belief that the plaintiff has suffered grievous injury for which she will
not be compensated because it was suffered outside the state, will
award damages far in excess of those necessary to compensate her for
her in-state injury.2 90 Thus, if a court does apply forum law to the in-
state portion of a multistate claim, the constitutional principles noted in
this Article require that, at a minimum, it take pains to assure that the
jury award for that portion bears a reasonable relationship to the pro-
portionate amount of harm caused within the state.
V. AVOIDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION-RESPECTING
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS THROUGH PROPER
APPLICATION OF STATE CHOICE OF LAW THEORIES
The Supreme Court has never directly considered the constitution-
ality of choice of law decisions in the defamation context, nor have
lower courts explicitly considered the issue. The viability of the argu-
ments set forth in this Article thus remains to be tested. Independent of
these arguments, however, thoughtful application of most extant choice
of law theories would lead most courts to the resolutions suggested
above.
For example, respect for the sovereignty of other states has always
been built into the territorialist approach. By applying the law of the
place of a particular significant event, as opposed to favoring forum
law, territorialist courts assured that each state's sovereignty would be
respected some of the time-whenever the significant event occurred
within its borders. Indeed, territorialist courts at times stated that re-
spect for the sovereignty of other states justified their approach.29' To
the extent territorialist courts arbitrarily select a particular significant
290 Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) ("The scarcity of testimony to show that Commissioner Sullivan suffered
any actual damages at all suggests that ... feelings of hostility had at least as much to
do with rendition of this half-million dollar verdict as did an appraisal of damages.").
21 See, e.g., Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 138-39, 11 So. 803,
808-09 (1892) ("The only true doctrine is that each sovereignty, state or nation, has the
exclusive power to finally determine and declare what act or omissions ... shall im-
pose a liability . . . and the courts of no other sovereignty can impute a damnifiying
quality to an act or omission which afforded no cause of action where it transpired.").
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event as controlling for choice of law purposes, consideration of the
constitutional principles noted by this Article, which point towards ap-
plication of the law of a state with a relatively significant compensatory
interest, can make the choice of the particular event more principled. At
the same time, such an approach will further the sovereignty-respecting
principles to which territorialist decisions traditionally conform.
Several modern choice of law approaches explicitly incorporate the
principles of respect for the sovereignty of other states and encourage-
ment of interstate activity. The Restatement (Second)'s292 identification
of "the needs of the interstate and international systems" as a factor to
be considered in choice of law2" 3 is an example. Consideration of this
factor, according to the accompanying comments, should lead courts to
decisions that respect the needs and policies of other states and that
facilitate commercial intercourse and harmonious relations with
them.19 4 These goals are entirely consistent with the theme of this Arti-
cle. In a similar vein, the Restatement (Second)'s directive that courts
consider the interests of other states is designed to assure that courts
seek "the best possible accommodation of [state] policies," an accommo-
dation that will generally lead to application of the law of the state
whose interests "are most deeply affected. 219 5 Such considerations
should likewise counsel courts to avoid potential nullification of sister
state sovereignty, leading them to apply the law of a state that will feel
the relatively significant effects of a defamation-a path this Article
argues is constitutionally compelled. In addition, decisions that discour-
age forum shopping will further the Restatement (Second)'s goals of
predictability and uniformity of result in choice of law decisions.2 98
While application of the Restatement (Second)'s general directive to ap-
ply the law of the plaintiff's domicile in defamation cases29 will usually
be consistent with the concerns expressed by this Article, attention to
those considerations explicitly noted by the Restatement (Second)
should lead courts delving more deeply into the requisite analysis to
reach results consistent with those this Article suggests.
Similarly, Dean Leflar's articulation of the better rule approach
requires consideration of "interstate and international order." 98 He
notes that consideration of this factor should lead courts to encourage
state interaction and defer to the law of "primarily concerned" states,
292 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
293 Id. § 6.
294 Id. § 6 comment d (1971).
2'95 Id. § 6 comment f.
296 See id., comment i.
297 See id. § 150 comment e.
298 See supra text accompanying note 113.
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even where the forum has an identifiable interest in applying its law.299
He also states that decisions discouraging forum shopping will further
the goal of predictability of results.300 Although better rule courts, in
recent cases, seem not to have given much credence to these princi-
ples,30' their clear pertinence in multistate defamation cases suggests
that courts should give them added weight.
Interest analysis also incorporates principles that, properly ap-
plied, should lead to results consistent with this Article. This Article
has shown that any deterrence interest a state may have in application
of its law should be accorded minimal, if any, weight in the defamation
context. 02 And even if an interest analysis court initially found that the
forum state's limited compensation interest justified application of fo-
rum law, Professor Currie would have it reconsider to see if a more
moderate and restrained interpretation of its policies might avoid a con-
flict with other interested states.303 Such reconsideration should lead
states to forego application of their law where the effects of the defama-
tion on the plaintiff within the state, and concomitantly the probable
benefit to the state affording the plaintiff recovery, are minimal or non-
existent. At most, the state's interest, on reconsideration, should be lim-
ited to the extent of the in-state harm. A court supplementing interest
analysis with comparative impairment principles'"4 should reach a simi-
lar result. Application of its relatively speech-inhibiting law whenever
it has minimal connections with the litigation may not merely impair,
but may effectively nullify, the interest of states with relatively speech-
enhancing laws. While the forum's policies may be partially impaired,
they will not be similarly nullified if its laws are applied to compensate
those with respect to whom it has a substantial compensation interest.
Thus, choice of law rules favoring application of the law of a state
whose interests would be most impaired should favor nonforum law
when the forum's connections with the litigation are minimal.
The one modern approach that cannot be reconciled with the con-
cerns stressed by this Article is the lex fori approach. The potential
29 See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267, 285-87 (1966).
300 See id. at 282-83.
301 See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
302 Indeed, courts using a "weighing of interests" approach may on occasion find
speech-enhancing interests of higher quality than either deterrence or compensation
interests, leading them to apply a law less speech-inhibiting than that of a state with a
significant compensatory interest. Cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347
(1974) (precluding compensation absent a showing of fault, thereby furthering speech-
enhancing interests notwithstanding harm to the plaintiff).
303 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
I" See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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constitutional problems inherent in this approach, however, should give
pause to courts that use it before they apply forum law in defamation
cases in which the forum state has a relatively minor compensation
interest.
Because most modern choice of law approaches incorporate princi-
ples that reflect the concerns stressed by this Article, courts should use
the choice of law model developed here. Its suggested resolution follows
not only from constitutional tenets but also from principled choice of
law considerations. The model normally will require application of the
law of a state that has a significant interest, relative to the interests of
other states of circulation, in compensating the plaintiff. Furthermore,
the concerns for efficiency and simplicity incorporated into some mod-
ern approaches should usually lead courts to apply that state's law to
all aspects of the case. Neither the concerns stressed by this Article nor
the choice of law principles that reflect them, however, would bar a
court's occasional reliance on other choice of law factors to apply an-
other state's more speech-enhancing law to a given issue."' But appli-
cation of more speech-inhibiting law would be inconsistent both with
constitutional concerns and with conflict of law principles that extant
approaches explicitly affirm.
CONCLUSION
The widespread susceptibility of defamation defendants to jurisdic-
tion is likely to result in an increasing amount of litigation over choice
of defamation law. This Article demonstrates that superficial reliance
on precedent enunciating constitutional limitations on choice of law will
not adequately protect important constitutional values in the context of
defamation law. Rather, courts deciding choice of law issues must be
particularly cognizant that largely unrestrained application of forum
defamation law can pose particular dangers, not present in other set-
tings, to values reflected by full faith and credit, federalism, and first
"I3 For example, a defendant may claim reliance on the protection of the shield
law of a state where information was obtained with a promise of confidentiality. Even
if this is not a state with a relatively significant compensation interest, the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) requires that courts consider the protection of justified expectations.
See supra note 89. The better rule of law approach also considers predictability of
results. See supra note 113 and accompanying text; Leflar, supra note 299, at 282-284.
These concerns may lead courts to apply that state's law. Similarly, a court weighing
the interests or applying the better rule tie-breaking criteria may consider a speech-
enhancing rule entitled to higher regard than a speech-intrusive rule. To apply such a
rule would not infringe on constitutional concerns. See supra pages 422-23. To apply a
more speech-inhibiting rule through application of these factors would, however, im-
pinge upon these concerns.
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amendment principles. Courts recognizing these dangers should take
them into account not merely as a matter of constitutional compulsion,
but also as a matter of sound common law decision making. If they do
so, and thereby generally apply defamation law no more speech-inhib-
iting than that of a state with a relatively significant compensation in-
terest, they will affirm values that have formed part of the basic struc-
ture of this nation.
